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ABSTRACT
Transnational domestic labor regulation (TDLR) is
unilateral regulation introduced by a government to influence
labor practices in foreign jurisdictions. TDLR has the potential
to empower foreign workers and influence the balance of power
in foreign industrial relations systems in ways that might lead
to improved labor conditions. Particularly interesting is the
potential for TDLR to harness or steer private labor
regulation—the many non-state sources of labor practice
governance already active in shaping labor conditions within
global supply chains. However, whether governments should try
to influence foreign labor practices at all is a controversial
question. This Article explores the arguments both for and
against a unilateral legislative strategy that aims to improve
working conditions in foreign countries. While the Article
ultimately supports this strategy, it concludes that the design of
the model must have as its principal objective the empowerment
of the foreign workers themselves. TDLR that is poorly designed
or loses sight of this objective can produce harmful results that
leave the workers even worse off.
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Governments of advanced economic nations have been wrestling
with an intriguing question: to what extent should they seek to use
their influence to improve labor practices in economically developing
countries? Should the U.S. government expend financial and political
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resources to improve working conditions in Chinese or Indian
factories? These are controversial questions.
On one side of the debate is the argument that determining
acceptable employment practices within a particular jurisdiction is
best left to its governing political leaders and the local industrial
relations actors, including employers, employees, and, where they
exist, unions. On the other side is the argument that while
multinational corporations (MNCs) have reaped huge financial
rewards from globalization and the proliferation of the global
sourcing model over the past quarter century, they have often done so
by exploiting poor working conditions in countries where independent
unions are nonexistent or outlawed altogether and where national
governments are either unable or unwilling to enforce decent labor
standards to protect workers.
In fact, Western governments have sought to influence working
conditions in developing countries through a variety of methods,
including support for direct trade–labor linkages in regional and
supranational trade agreements and “soft law” measures intended to
reward decent labor practices and punish offensive ones.1 Some
governments have also enacted unilateral legislation intended to
influence labor practices in foreign jurisdictions.2 This Article focuses
on unilateral legislation and, more specifically, on the debates that
surround this form of regulation.
Legislation enacted in one country that is intended to influence
labor practices in other countries can be labeled “transnational
domestic labor regulation” (TDLR).3 It is “transnational” in the broad
sense envisioned by Philip Jessup, who defined transnational law to

1.
See, e.g., Simon Deakin & Richard Hobbs, False Dawn for CSR? Shifts in
Regulatory Policy and the Response of the Corporate and Financial Sectors in Britain,
15 CORP. GOVERNANCE 68, 68–75 (2007) (focusing on the “social dimension” of
corporate social responsibility); Maria Gillen, The Apparel Industry Partnership’s Free
Labor Association: A Solution to the Overseas Sweatshop Problem or the Emperor’s New
Clothes?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1059, 1062–64 (2000) (describing the founding of
the Free Labor Association and its Workplace Code and Monitoring Principles);
Katherine Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational
Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 987, 1006–19 (1995) (comparing two methods
used by North American countries to expand transnational labor regulation: (1)
carrying out the North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) enforcement and
monitoring mechanisms, and (2) applying U.S. labor law extraterritorially).
2.
Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law: The U.S.
Approach, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 253, 253–54 (1987).
3.
David J. Doorey, Who Made That? Influencing Foreign Labour Practices
Through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 365
(2005) [hereinafter Doorey, Who Made That?] (discussing the use of domestic
regulation to influence foreign labor practices, but employing the terminology of
“decentralized regulation” and “reflexive law” rather than “transnational domestic
labor regulation”); David J. Doorey, Transnational Domestic Labour Regulation: Using
Domestic Disclosure Regulation to Influence Foreign Labour Practices 7 (Apr. 2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School) (on file with author).
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include “all law which regulates actions and events that transcend
national frontiers. Both public and private international law are
included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard
categories.”4 State-based laws that create incentives for foreign
governments to improve labor laws or for foreign producers to
improve labor practices are included. For example, Generalized
Systems of Preferences grant import preferences based on compliance
with specified labor standards.5 A law that denies the importation of
a product made under working conditions that violate a standard—
such as the standard not to use child or prison labor—would also
qualify as TDLR, since the objective of the law is to encourage foreign
suppliers to cease the offending practice.6
However, this Article is mostly interested in regulation that is
designed to influence or steer the behavior of MNCs and the many
factory owners they engage around the world to produce their goods.7
This type of TDLR offers interesting potential in an era in which
capital is global and governance of business behavior is divided into
complex arenas of government and private forms of regulation. It
draws on the lessons of so-called “de-centered” or “reflexive" legal
theory, which is often labeled “New Governance” in North America.8

4.
PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 3 (1956).
5.
See Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized
System of Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 199, 199 (2003)
(providing the basic principles of the Generalized System of Preferences); Kevin
Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory Approaches in
the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 203, 213–14 (2007)
(discussing examples in the United States such as legislation on loans issued by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation); Yaraslau Kryvoi, Why European Union
Trade Sanctions Do Not Work, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 209, 209–11 (2008) (providing a
brief historical overview of the Generalized System of Preferences in the European
Union).
6.
This was the intended model of legislation U.S. Senator Bill Harkin
introduced in the mid-1990s that proposed to ban products made by “child labor,” later
known as the Child Labor Deterrence Act, S. 613, 103d Cong. (1993). See Kaushik
Basu, Compacts, Conventions, and Codes: Initiatives for Higher International Labor
Standards, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 487, 490–91 (2001).
7.
See Basu, supra note 6, at 490 (using the phrase “extra-national action” to
describe “action taken by a nation within its own territory that creates incentives in
other countries to improve [international labor standards].” (emphasis added)). My use
of TDLR is broader in that it is intended to include legislation that aims to influence
normative labor practices by influencing the conditions under which those practices
emerge. This may include legislation intended to encourage foreign states to take
action on labor practices, but influencing government action is only one possible variant
of TDLR. TDLR also targets the actual employers, the MNCs that source from them,
and the many other private actors they engage with on labor practice matters.
8.
For a thorough overview of the New Governance literature, see Julia Black,
Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a
“Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2001); Orly Lobel, The Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 343, 344 (2004) (introducing the conceptual framework of
the de-centered New Governance model). On “reflexive law,” see Harry Arthurs,
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The idea, in very general terms, is that some social and economic
problems are more effectively addressed through indirect legal
signals that guide, steer, or encourage changes in behavior by
influencing the practical conditions under which behavioral norms
emerge.9 A de-centered legal orientation encourages lawmakers to
think about what sorts of legal signals might create the perception for
employers or MNCs that improving labor practices is in their
economic interest.
Viewing concerns about abusive labor practices within global
supply chains through the lens of de-centered regulation opens up
possibilities for the use of regulation to harness and agitate those
forces that, in practice, already influence normative labor conditions.
Labor practices within modern global supply chains are today
determined not only by national labor laws and prevailing market
conditions, but also by pressures, rules, risks, and opportunities
whose origins lie in the efforts of non-state activists interested in
improving labor practices. These activists employ a number of
tactics: they utilize investigations, monitoring, and campaigns, or the
threat of them, by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), unions,
academics, and journalists; they encourage multi-stakeholder and
industry-led initiatives seeking to eliminate sweatshops; student
activists pressure their educational institutions to adopt “no sweat”
policies; and consumers and activist investors avoid companies that
condone abusive labor practices.
The rules and norms that developed from the interactions of
these groups with employers and MNCs have been variously
described as “outsourced,” “non-governmental,”10 or “private labor
regulation” (PLR)11—the term this Article employs. If PLR in fact

Corporate Self-Regulation: Political Economy, State Regulation, and Reflexive Labor
Law, in REGULATING LABOR IN THE WAKE OF GLOBALISATION (Cynthia Estlund & Brian
Bercusson eds., 2008); Doorey, Who Made That?, supra note 3, at 366–72 (discussing
the decentralized role of the state and the reflexive law paradigm for influencing
corporate behavior abroad); David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to
Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 42–48 (1999); Gunther Teubner,
Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 239, 239
(1983).
9.
See, e.g., Hess, supra note 8, at 50 (discussing the merits of reflexive law in
guiding the regulatory behavior of private actors).
10.
See Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-Governmental
Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 2 (2003).
11.
See Kolben, supra note 5, at 225–26.
Perhaps the most important story to emerge in international labor rights has
been the rise of a parallel system of labor rights enforcement that might be
termed “private regulation.” Private regulation in the context of transnational
labor encompasses a broad range of practices, generally outside of the strict
purview of the State, that serve to regulate working conditions and the
employer-employee relationship. The actors in such a system are not solely
businesses and their agents, but also include a broad range of civil society
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influences labor practices, as many authors have claimed, then this
creates opportunities for TDLR that have been underexplored in legal
literature. For instance, if MNCs are more likely to insist that their
suppliers comply with local labor laws because failing to do so will
lead to negative publicity in an NGO campaign, then a law
empowering the NGOs may create greater pressure on MNCs to
monitor their suppliers’ labor practices. In other words, TDLR could
be used to harness PLR to raise the probability of improved labor
conditions in supplier factories.
A law might require MNCs to disclose information about their
global supply chains and thereby increase the risk in permitting
abusive labor conditions in their supplier factories to go unchecked.12
States can use regulation to inject risk into supply chain management
systems with the expectation that the companies’ risk management
responses will ultimately improve the environment under which labor
practice norms emerge. A law requiring every supplier to be
identified with a name and address, for example, could alter the
power dynamic between the MNC, its suppliers, and the many
private activists engaged in monitoring and reporting on supply chain
labor practices. Such a law would make it easier and cheaper for the
activists to monitor a company’s activities, thereby increasing the risk
that abusive labor conditions will be exposed.13 This change in
relative power could indirectly encourage the MNC or the contractor
to take steps to reduce the possibility of exposure as a labor rights
violator, which in turn could have a positive effect on labor practices.
Whether or not a law that seeks to indirectly influence supply
chain labor practices would be effective in practice is an interesting,
and as yet, largely untested hypothesis. However, there is another
question that needs to be addressed first: whether a regulatory TDLR
project that seeks to harness the power of PLR, with the aim of
improving foreign labor practices, is good policy. Ultimately, this
Article’s objective is to defend the use of TDLR as a means of
improving labor practices in foreign jurisdictions. However, the
Article also recommends that the form and design of any such

members that participate in the private regulatory process, including welfare
and human rights organizations, churches, and trade unions.
Id.
12.
See Doorey, Who Made That?, supra note 3, at 393–95 (discussing a
proposed amendment to Canada’s Act Respecting the Labeling, Sale, Importation, and
Advertising of Consumer Textile Articles, R.S.C. 1985, c. T–10, that would require
disclosure of factory location).
13.
Id.; see also David Doorey, Can Factory List Disclosure Improve Labor
Practices in the Apparel Industry? A Case Study of Nike and Levi-Strauss 2 (Comp. L.
& Pol. Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Doorey, Factory
List Disclosure], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1000198.
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regulation must take account of some legitimate warnings and
lessons described by critics of this form of transnational regulation.
Part I explores the question of why a government would consider
passing legislation that targets foreign labor practices. In other
words, is it feasible that the plight of foreign workers could push its
way onto the busy legislative agendas of governments today? In fact,
improving labor practices in developing states is already on the
agenda of the governments of many developed countries, and some
have actually passed laws to try to influence those practices. It does
not require too great a leap of faith to imagine that other
governments could be influenced to take similar measures in the
future, particularly if their citizens continue to express concern about
labor practices.
The remainder of this Article is devoted to debating the key
arguments in favor of and against the use of domestic regulation to
influence foreign labor practices. Part II examines anticipated
arguments against TDLR. Part III considers responses to these
arguments and outlines arguments in support of TDLR. One theme
that emerges from these debates is that a key focus of any long-term
strategy to improve labor conditions is the need to effect change in
local industrial relations systems, most notably by finding ways to
empower the workers themselves in their dealings with their
employers. Part IV fleshes out this argument and contends that the
need to encourage the development of countervailing power to capital
at the local level should shape any attempt to develop a strategy of
TDLR.
I. FOREIGN LABOR PRACTICES AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL
AGENDA WITHIN DEVELOPED STATES
The notion that national governments have an interest in labor
conditions in foreign states is not new. The original constitution of
the International Labour Organization (ILO), Chapter XIII of the
Treaty of Versailles of 1919, observed that the “failure of any nation
to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of
other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own
countries.”14 More recently, the vast expansion of global sourcing,
combined with the dismantling of trade barriers, provoked
heightened interest in the relative conditions of labor around the
world. In the advanced economic nations of the global North, this
renewed interest in conditions of work in the global South frequently
resulted in requests for tariffs or outright bans on the importation of
goods from one or more countries in order to protect local industries

14.

J. ATLESON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW 51 (2009).
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and employment from what is perceived as unfair trade caused by the
availability of cheap labor abroad.15
But often, especially in the past decade, the argument in favor of
government action to encourage improved foreign labor practices has
been characterized as an ethical issue—“rich” countries have a
responsibility to use their power to protect vulnerable workers in
“poor” countries from labor abuses when their own governments are
either incapable or unwilling to do so.16 The responses of Western
governments to demands from their citizens to play an active role in
encouraging improved labor practices in developing states have
varied.
The Canadian government recently commissioned a study of a
proposal made by an NGO, the Ethical Trading Action Group, that
would have amended the regulations of the Federal Textile Labeling
Act to require disclosure of the name and address of the factory where
a garment is manufactured.17 For a variety of reasons—including,
most notably, industry resistance—the final report rejected the
proposal to require factory information disclosure.18 However, it
acknowledged a strong consensus among industries and NGOs in
favor of an increased role for the Canadian government in helping to
promote improved labor practices in foreign jurisdictions:
There is strong support from all stakeholders for the Canadian
government to enhance its multi and bilateral efforts to encourage
other countries to enforce international labour standards (such as those
identified by the ILO). Some of the activities suggested include:
!

Linking access to the Canadian market to compliance with basic
labour standards;

!

Supporting the protection of labour standards in multilateral trade
agreements;

15.
See PIETRA RIVOLI, THE TRAVELS OF A T-SHIRT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
AN ECONOMIST EXAMINES THE MARKETS, POWER, AND POLITICS OF WORLD TRADE 171
(2005) (exploring the many efforts of American apparel makers, retailers, and unions to
persuade lawmakers to prohibit or limit apparel imports from low-wage countries in
order to protect “American jobs”); Brian Langille, Eight Ways to Think About
International Labor Standards, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 27, 38 (1997) (discussing the
inherent hypocrisy in accusing another nation of unfairly offering cheaper labor).
16.
See, e,g., Iris Young, Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, 12 J. POL.
PHIL. 365, 374 (2004) (arguing that advanced economic states and their citizens have a
“political responsibility” to advance labor rights in developing countries).
17.
See Act Respecting the Labeling, Sale, Importation, and Advertising of
Consumer Textile Articles, R.S.C. 1985, c. T–10; Textile Labeling and Advertising
Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1551 (Can.); COMPETITION BUREAU, GUIDE TO TEXTILE
LABELING AND ADVERTISING REGULATIONS (2000), http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/
cp/textile.pdf. The findings of the study are found in DAVID BROOK & ANITA MAYER,
PUB. POLICY FORUM, CONSULTATION ON A PROPOSAL TO VERIFY LABOUR STANDARDS IN
THE
APPAREL
INDUSTRY:
OUTCOMES
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
(2003),
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/2005-07-22_etag_eng.pdf/
$file/2005-07-22_etag_eng.pdf.
18.
BROOK & MAYER, supra note 17, at 1–2.
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Working with bilateral trading partners to help develop and
implement appropriate and effective mechanisms to support basic
labour rights; and

!

Creating an organization like the FLA . . . to help identify and
promote best practices in encouraging and enabling fair labour
practices both domestically and internationally.19

961

Through a variety of institutions and measures, the Canadian
government already actively encourages and assists Canadian
businesses in developing corporate social responsibility systems and
practices for global business and encourages improved enforcement of
labor standards in foreign countries.20
And Canada is a relatively minor player in this regard. The
British Department of Trade and Industry was recently assigned the
task of promoting better “social” practices by British companies.21
The Ethical Trading Initiative was created in 1998, with the
encouragement and financial support of the Department, in response
to “increasing pressure—from trade unions, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and UK consumers . . . to ensure decent
working conditions for the people who produce the goods they sell.”22
In the United States during the mid-1990s, the Clinton
Administration responded to pressures from the public, labor groups,
and domestic textile and apparel producers to address American
apparel companies’ use of low-wage workers in other parts of the
world by facilitating the creation of the Apparel Industry Partnership
in 1996, which later formed the Fair Labor Association (FLA).23
American politicians have proposed legislation that would either limit
imports of consumer goods made under abusive labor practices or
reward corporations that adopt codes of conduct with labor
components and take specified steps towards ensuring compliance

19.
Id.
20.
See, e.g., Corporate Social Responsibility, INDUST. CANADA, http://strategis.ic.gc.
ca/epic/site/csr-rse.nsf/en/Home (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (describing “corporate social
responsibility” initiatives that encourage Canadian businesses to strive to improve
labor practices abroad); Overview: The International Trade and Labour Grants and
Contributions Program, LABOUR, http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/lp/ila/Overview.shtml (last
visited Sept. 26, 2010) (focusing “on promoting good governance and the rule of law,
respect for international labour standards, a more equitable distribution of the benefits
of globalization, and participating in international efforts to improve respect for labour
rights”).
21.
Deakin & Hobbs, supra note 1, at 68.
22.
Ethical Trade Initiative, JOINT INITIATIVE ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
AND WORKERS RIGHTS, http://www.jo-in.org/participating.htm#ethical (last visited Sept.
26, 2010); see also ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/Z/abteti/
index.shtml (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
23.
Gillen, supra note 1, at 1062; Thomas A. Hemphill, The White House
Apparel Industry Partnership Agreement: Will Self-Regulation Be Successful?, 104 BUS.
& SOC’Y REV. 121, 123 (1999).
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throughout their global supply chains.24 The U.S. government also
insisted on the inclusion of a “labor side agreement” in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as in other
subsequent trade agreements, and generally has pursued an
aggressive strategy of unilateral and bilateral trade-based initiatives
that encourage foreign states to improve their domestic labor
standards and practices.25
The German government utilizes the Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), a publicly funded company, in pursuit of
improved labor conditions in developing countries.26 The Federal
Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development noted recently
the government’s commitment to advancing labor standards in the
preface to a report of the GTZ, entitled Making Globalisation Socially
Equitable: Implementing Core Labor Standards in Selected German
Development Cooperation Projects:
The German Government attaches great importance to implementing
internationally accepted social standards, regarding them as an
important part of human rights to which all countries - and business
enterprises as well - must measure up. We aim to contribute to global
economic development and at the same time to help establish decent
working and living conditions in developing countries. In this context,
the ILO quite rightly points out that labor standards play a special role
in achieving a greater balance between social progress and economic
growth.27

Among other projects, the GTZ helped fund the development of the
RUGMARK initiative that targets child labor in India.28

24.
Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 5377, 109th Cong. (2006); see also Arthurs, supra
note 8, at 23 (describing the Corporate Code of Conduct Act, introduced by Democrat
Cynthia McKinney, which would have required American corporations that employ
greater than twenty people in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, to adopt a code of
conduct regarding workers’ rights, core labor standards, environmental standards, and
human rights, and would have given preference in the awarding of government
contracts to companies in compliance).
25.
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.–Can.–Mex., Sept.
13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC]; see also Marley Weiss, Two Steps
Forward, One Step Back—Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights Under Free Trade Agreements
from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L.
REV. 689, 689–90 (2003) (commenting on the expansion of the NAALC model to
subsequent trade agreements).
26.
About Us – Corporate Profile, GTZ, http://www.gtz.de/en/689.htm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2010).
27.
Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul, Preface to THE WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL
STANDARDS, MAKING GLOBALISATION SOCIALLY EQUITABLE: IMPLEMENTING CORE
LABOR STANDARDS IN SELECTED GERMAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROJECTS
(2004), http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-ak-broschuere.pdf.
28.
See Sayan Chakrabarty & Ulrike Grote, The Impact of Social Labeling on
Child Labor in the Indian Carpet Industry (Leibniz Univ. Hannover, Faculty of Econ.
and Mgmt., Working Paper No. 366, 2007), http://www.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/
Forschung/Diskussionspapiere/dp-366.pdf.
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Other countries have recently invested in initiatives to
encourage domestic corporations to adhere to the principals and
standards set out in international instruments.
The Swedish
government introduced the Swedish Partnership for Global
Responsibility in 2002 to encourage companies to adhere to the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and to the principals of the
UN Global Compact.29 In 2003, the Italian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs introduced an initiative known as Global Compact Italy:
Sustainable Development through the Global Compact.
The
initiative encourages Italian companies to respect the Global
Compact, the ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational
Enterprises, and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises
in their international activities.30
The French government introduced disclosure regulation aimed
at influencing how large French companies manage labor conditions
throughout their global supply chains. The Nouvelles Régulations
Economiques (NRE), adopted in 2001, and Decree Number 2002–221,
passed in February 2002, require France’s largest corporations to
report annually on a broad range of environmental and social issues,
including many direct indicators of labor practices.31 In addition to
the requirements to report on human resources and labor issues, the
Decree requires that the corporations report on “community issues,”
an attempt to identify a company’s social and environmental footprint
in the communities in which it operates.32 One notable requirement
is that companies must indicate the extent to which their subsidiaries
follow ILO core conventions; the methodologies used to track this
information; and “the importance of subcontracting to their
operations and how they promote compliance by their subcontractors

29.
Jonathan Lux et al., The European Initiatives, in CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 279, 295 (Ramon
Mullerat & Daniel Brennan eds., 2005).
30.
Global Compact Italy – Sustainable Development Through the Global
Compact, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.int/public/english/region/eurpro/rome/
projects/03.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
31.
Loi 2001–420 du 15 Mai 2001 [Law 2001–420 of May 15, 2001], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 16,
2001; Décret 2002–221 du 20 Février 2002 [Decree 2002–221 of February 20, 2002],
J.O., Feb. 21, 2002, p. 3360. The Regulations apply to French companies listed on the
premier marché, which consists of companies with the largest market capitalization
value. See Lucien Dhooge, Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and France’s
Nouvelles Régulations Economiques, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 441, 445–52 (2004)
(providing a brief history of the NRE social disclosure requirements and an overview of
the NRE social disclosure scheme); see also Cynthia Williams, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197,
1293–96 (1999) (arguing that American securities laws should require a similar
reporting on global activities, including reports on a variety of labor-related variables).
32.
See Dhooge, supra note 31, at 450–51 (describing Article 148–2 of the
Decree).
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with fundamental labor rights, including conventions of the
International Labor Organization.”33
One can speculate on why governments expend resources on
these activities. Perhaps they believe that domestic businesses will
be more productive and competitive if they source from foreign
employers who treat their employees decently (an economic
argument); or that all governments have a responsibility to advance
human rights issues everywhere (a human rights argument); or that
abusive labor practices in foreign jurisdictions amount to an unfair
trade advantage over local producers (a trade argument); or that
voters simply expect their government to participate in improving
conditions for foreign workers (a political argument). Regardless of
the reasons, it is clear that the issue of foreign labor practices has
already made it onto to the political agenda of many governments.
TDLR is also a politically viable idea because it may be
attractive to politicians from across the political spectrum. It draws
on the same core set of beliefs as New Governance and de-centered
regulatory approaches.34 These approaches to regulation are usually
directed at the governance of domestic activities, whereas TDLR
targets foreign activities, but the similarities are obvious. The
philosophy suggests the use of regulation to influence the private
development of norms by altering the power relations that shape
private negotiations about those norms.35 Even those politicians
otherwise suspicious of business regulation, and of labor regulation in
particular, may find this approach attractive because it draws on
market forces, citizen empowerment through information creation
and dissemination, and a vision of the state as a facilitator.36 This
approach fits within their worldview of the appropriate role of the
state in governing economic actors.
Politicians on the more progressive side of the political spectrum
may also find TDLR attractive, particularly if it includes provisions
aimed at empowering labor and human rights activists in their
engagements with MNCs and employers. We would expect activists
and their political allies to support regulation that makes it easier or

33.
Id. Dhooge also notes that drafting ambiguities in the Decree led to
confusion about which disclosure requirements apply to foreign operations and which
apply solely to operations within France. Id. at 476–77. For more information, see
discussion in Mary Lou Egan et al., France’s Nouvelles Regulations Economiques:
Using Government Mandates for Corporate Reporting to Promote Environmentally
Sustainable Economic Development 11 (unpublished manuscript) (Nov. 2003),
http://bendickegan.com/pdf/EganMauleonWolffBendick.pdf.
34.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
35.
Black, supra note 8.
36.
See, e.g., Harry W. Arthurs, The Administrative State Goes to Market (and
Cries ‘Wee, Wee, Wee’ All the Way Home), 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 797, 809 (2005)
(describing how “neoliberals” perceive the purpose of regulation “to facilitate rather
than constrain private conduct”).
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less costly to uncover reputation-damaging information about
MNCs.37 It is even possible that corporations would support some
forms of TDLR, particularly if there was a realistic possibility of some
alternative measures that would impose more direct or costly forms of
regulation or if the corporation had already taken all or part of the
steps proposed in the legislation. For example, after Levi-Strauss
voluntarily disclosed publicly the names and addresses of its global
supplier list, its vice president in charge of global supplier labor
issues indicated he was supportive of a law that would require all
apparel manufacturers to do the same as a means of leveling the
playing field.38
Therefore, while the prospects should not be overstated, the
political conditions may be sufficiently favorable in some countries to
warrant the more thorough and critical exploration of the TDLR. Of
course, the fact that there may be pressure on governments to
address abusive labor practices in developing countries does not mean
that those governments will, or should, respond in the form of
regulation. The question of whether governments should attempt to
influence workplace behavior in other countries is the subject of the
remainder of this Article.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST A TRANSNATIONAL DOMESTIC
LABOR REGULATION (TDLR) PROJECT AND PRIVATE
LABOR REGULATION (PLR)
There are a number of arguments against using domestic
regulation to harness, influence, or shape the private creation of labor
practice norms in foreign jurisdictions.
The following section
comments on six of them.

37.
See, e.g., Submission from Ethical Trading Action Grp. on Transparency and
Disclosure: New Regulatory Tools to Challenge Sweatshop Abuses to Pub. Policy Forum’s
Nat’l Consultation on Textile Labelling, Transparency, and Disclosure (Sept. 30, 2003),
http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/sites/maquilasolidarity.org/files/ETAGExecutiveSummary.pdf;
see also Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 5377, 109th Cong. (2006) (“It is time we reclaim the
global economy for the people who make it work and stop pandering to corporate
interests who build their empires on the backs of the innocent.”). The Ethical Trading
Action Group is a coalition of trade unions, human rights organizations, and faithbased organizations interested in improving labor conditions in developing states.
About ETAG, MAQUILA SOLIDARITY NETWORK, http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/about/
etag (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
38.
Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 57–58.
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A. TDLR Undermines Foreign Government National
Sovereignty and Comparative Advantage
The initiatives and campaigns of labor activists may promote
standards that are inconsistent with domestic laws or that impose
more demanding requirements for employers than those set out in
the local labor laws where factories are located. By attempting to
raise labor standards above those required by local laws and
prevailing market conditions, PLR interferes with the sovereign right
of national governments to determine domestic labor policies.
Furthermore, it undermines the comparative advantage of relatively
low labor costs that economically developing states exploit in order to
attract MNC investment. In other words, PLR is a form of Northern
protectionism.39
Consequently, state-based regulation that
encourages and legitimizes PLR initiatives also constitutes an
indirect form of protectionism aimed at discounting the comparative
advantage of low labor standards.
There are several ways in which PLR initiatives may undermine
national labor policies. One occurs if a state has introduced labor
laws but has no intention of actually enforcing those laws or if a state
has ratified an international labor convention with no intention of
implementing it into national laws. For example, some developing
countries have established de facto export processing zones in which
there exists an implicit understanding that labor laws will not be
enforced or at least will be largely ignored.40 PLR that encourages
compliance with national labor laws, or with ratified international
conventions, would conflict with a state policy of noncompliance and
nonenforcement. In these circumstances, the government does not

39.
See, e.g., Basu, supra note 6, at 491 (discussing how legislation such as the
Child Labor Deterrence Act, S. 613, 103d Cong. (1993), “enable[s] protectionism in the
north”); Letter from Jagdish Bhagwati to Columbia Univ. Comm. on a Living Wage
(Feb. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Bhagwati], available at http://archives.econ.utah.edu/
archives/marxism/2004w07/msg00043.htm.
[M]any (including altruistic NGOs) in the poor countries see the drive towards
raising the local cost of production of apparel in particular (because that is
where the export advantage of the poor countries has always raised demands
for protection by our textile unions such as UNITE and corporate interests in
the industry) by paying yet higher wages (exceeding even the wage premium
[already paid by most MNCs] as essentially “masked protectionism” which is
aimed essentially at reducing the force of international competition.
Bhagwati, supra.
40.
See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the
Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 403–11 (2001); see also Kryvoi, supra note 5, at 214, 217, 219
(arguing that governments fail to enforce core international labor conventions because:
(1) they lack the capacity or expertise to enforce these standards; (2) they are
ideologically opposed to the standards (“political reasons”); or (3) they believe doing so
will discourage foreign inward investment (“economic reasons”)).
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want assistance with enforcement because effective enforcement
actually undermines the government’s labor strategy.
PLR may also conflict with national labor polices in more obvious
ways by producing standards and norms that conflict directly with
domestic labor laws. For example, most contemporary private labor
initiatives require employers to respect freedom of association and
the rights to unionize, engage in collective bargaining, and strike,41
but these requirements conflict with national labor laws if applied to
thousands of suppliers operating in China. These are all “core” rights
in ILO instruments, enshrined not only in Conventions 87 (on
freedom of association and the protection of the right to organize) and
98 (on the right to organize and collective bargaining), but also in the
Constitution of the ILO and in its 1998 Declaration on Fundamental
Principals and Rights at Work.42 However, Chinese law does not
permit independent unions and free collective bargaining, and China
has not ratified either ILO Convention 87 or 98.43 Therefore, not only
do many PLR initiatives demand that employers provide greater
rights to workers than required by Chinese law, but they also require
employers to act in a manner that violates Chinese labor law.44
41.
O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 2.
42.
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, pmbl. para.
2(a), June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233 (declaring the right to collectively bargain as a
fundamental right); Convention Concerning the Application of the Right to Organise
and Bargain Collectively (No. 98) pmbl., art. 1.1, July 7, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257
(declaring a right of workers to bargain collectively, and protecting workers from
antiunion discrimination, respectively); Convention Concerning Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise (No. 87) art. 11, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17
(requiring ILO members to take all necessary and appropriate steps to ensure that
workers may organize); ILO Constitution pmbl., June 28, 1919, 15 U.N.T.S. 35
(recognizing the right to freedom of association); see also ATLESON, supra note 14, at
57–66 (discussing the “constitutional” primacy of Conventions 87 and 98, and the ILO
Declaration).
43.
See Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for
Regulatory Innovation in the People’s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT.’L L.J. 1050,
1072–74 (2007) (discussing the inadequacies of China’s official trade union
organization and the prohibition against unions formed without official approval).
44.
Some private initiatives have attempted to resolve this difficulty by
requiring employers to recognize “alternative” or “parallel” methods for workers to gain
collective representation in countries where independent unions are illegal. An
example is the Base Code of the Ethical Trading Initiative, a U.K.-based NGO, which
provides, “Where the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining is
restricted under law, the employer facilitates, and does not hinder, the development of
parallel means for independent and free association and bargaining.” ETI Base Code,
ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE (June 25, 2009), http://www.ethicaltrade.org/eti-base-code
[hereinafter ETI Base Code]. The ETI has explained this article as follows:
The trade union organisations which are members of ETI have never believed
that it was possible to trade ethically in countries where fundamental workers
rights are denied in this systematic manner. However, in recognition of the
reality of China’s dominance in global manufacturing, and the unwillingness of
ETI member companies and other companies to move their production from
China to democratic states, the ETI trade union side agreed article 2.4 of the
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Why should the government of one country encourage the private
development of labor practice rules and norms that are inconsistent
with the national laws of other countries? Perhaps the example of
freedom of association in China is not ideal for confronting the
problem of conflict between private and state regulation. It might be
tempting to dismiss the issue by pointing out that freedom of
association, the right to unionize, the right to collective bargaining,
and the right to strike are today so universally accepted as
fundamental human rights that China, or any other state, has no
claim to a sovereign right to suppress them on the basis of
philosophical, political, or economic beliefs. Certainly, this is the
view of the ILO itself, which has long asserted that respect for the
principles in Conventions 87 and 98 is implied in its Constitution and
therefore is a requirement for ILO members, including China.45
Therefore, an argument can be made that governments have a
“moral” or “political” duty to promote the realization of fundamental
human rights in foreign states, even if the governments of those
states would prefer for any number of reasons not to respect these
human rights.46 This is a strong argument for encouraging PLR that
might lead to greater respect for internationally recognized “core”
labor rights. If all PLR pursued the singular objective of encouraging
respect for a bundle of universally accepted “fundamental” rights,
then regulation that encourages PLR could be justified on those
terms.47 For example, if a government believes that the Global

Base Code. In those countries in which freedom of association is denied by law,
but only in those countries, the ETI base code requires member companies to
facilitate parallel means for independent and free association and bargaining,
for example by supporting the establishment of other forms of independent
representative structures for workers, such as health and safety committees.
Until now, there have been no such examples of sustainable alternative
structure in these dictatorships and such limited structures do not comply with
any international labor standard.
ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(2005), http://www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/resources/ETI%20Freedom%20of
%20association%20and%20collective%20bargaining,%20Guidance.pdf.
45.
Adelle Blackett, Codes of Conduct and the Labour Regulatory State in
Developing Countries, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW 121, 126 (John Kirkton & Michael
Trebilcock eds., 2004); see also Roy Adams, The Supreme Court, Collective Bargaining,
and International Law: A Reply to Brian Langille, 14 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 111 (2009).
46.
See Young, supra note 16, at 374–83 (arguing in favor of the existence of
such a responsibility).
47.
In practice, very few if any states actually comply fully with the ILO’s core
conventions on freedom of association (Conventions 87 and 98). For instance, Canadian
governments are frequently found to be in violation of these Conventions by ILO
supervisory bodies. See Brian Burkett et al., Canada and the ILO: Freedom of
Association Since 1982, 10 CAN. LAB &. EMP. L.J. 231, 249–250 (1985); see also
Reference re Public Service Employees Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.)
(holding that the Charter’s protection of freedom of association does not include a right
to strike, even though Convention 87, which Canada ratified in 1972, has been
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Compact, the SA8000, or the FLA encourages respect for universally
recognized labor rights, then it could require companies within its
regulatory grasp to join those programs and to report on their
compliance.48
Difficulties arise, however, because of the uncertainty associated
with PLR. It may evolve in unpredictable ways and produce norms
that are inconsistent with those desired by a regulating state wishing
to harness PLR to produce specific labor practice norms in foreign
workplaces. Although it is possible that PLR may produce results
consistent with the values of the regulating state, or with
international legal norms such as those espoused by the ILO, there is
no guarantee that labor practices will evolve along those lines. Nor is
it certain that the norms and standards pursued through PLR, the
regulating state’s opinion of what norms and standards are desirable,
or the nature of internationally recognized norms and standards will
remain constant over time. This creates a perennial threat of
incongruence between the objectives of the regulating state and the
outcomes of the private regulation it has sought to harness in pursuit
of those objectives.
The “living wage” requirement better illustrates this problem.
Whereas most governments, and even most MNCs, may be prepared
to concede, at least rhetorically, that freedom of association and
collective bargaining rights should be respected in work places, there
is comparatively little agreement on the desirability of a living wage
requirement.49 The precise definition of a living wage and how to
calculate it is a matter of considerable debate, even within the labor
rights movement itself, although it is generally understood to involve
some measure of compensation that provides workers with the means
to afford the basic necessities of life in the communities in which they

interpreted by the ILO to include that right). Therefore, even states that have
relatively advanced economic and legal systems have difficulty satisfying ILO “core”
standards. This is a fact often noted by governments of developing countries and other
opponents of PLR initiatives and campaigns that call for compliance with these
standards by employers in economically developing states.
48.
See, e.g., Archon Fung, Deliberative Democracy and International Labor
Standards, 16 GOVERNANCE 51 (2003) (arguing for regulatory intervention that
encourages “decentralized deliberation” about labor standards by private and public
actors, including disclosure requirements); ARCHON FUNG, DARA O’ROURKE & CHARLES
SABEL, Realizing Labor Standards, in CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? 26
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2001) (arguing that states could encourage PLR by
requiring companies to adopt a code of conduct and report on supplier compliance with
its terms).
49.
See Wesley Cragg, Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New
Social Contract, 27 J. BUS. ETHICS 205, 208 (2000) (noting that because corporate codes
of conduct tend to be self-serving, they do not typically protect the human rights of
employees unless the corporation will benefit, but that many corporations, in fact, do
benefit from developing practices that protect the human rights of employees);
Bhagwati, supra note 39 (arguing that a living wage requirement is the “wrong way to
[g]o” toward defining social responsibility for multinational employers).
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live. The SA8000 Code of Conduct includes the following language:
“8.1 The company shall ensure that wages paid for a standard
working week shall always meet at least legal or industry minimum
standards and shall be sufficient to meet basic needs of personnel and
to provide some discretionary income.”50 This definition is typical in
that it treats legal minimum wage laws as a floor. The usual
expectation is that a living wage will be higher than that required by
the domestic statutory minimum wage laws, where they exist.51
The living wage, as it applies to global supply chains,52 has been
advanced almost exclusively by private labor activists pressuring
MNCs and universities. Some corporate-supported private labor
initiatives today include a living wage standard, most notably the
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) in the United Kingdom53 and the
Workers’ Rights Consortium (WRC) and the SA8000 Standard in the
United States.54 However, the FLA studied and rejected the living

50 SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 8000, § 8.1 (2005),
available at http://www.sa-intl.org/document/docWindow.cfm?fuseaction=document.
viewDocument&documentid=136&documentFormatId=244; see also UNIV. OF
TORONTO, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LICENSEES § 4(C)(1) (2010), http://www.trademarks.
utoronto.ca/downloads/code_of_conduct.pdf (“Licensees and their contractors must
provide wages and benefits which comply with all applicable laws and regulations and
which match or exceed the local prevailing wages and benefits in the relevant industry
or which constitute a living wage, whichever provides greater wages and benefits.”).
51.
See Living Wage Standards in Codes of Conduct, MANQUILA SOLIDARITY
NETWORK (Oct. 1, 2004), http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/node/320 [hereinafter Living
Wage Standards].
The [minimum wage required by law standard] is obviously the easiest to
accurately measure, but has been deemed inadequate by most parties because
legal minimum wage has been kept artificially low in most countries to attract
investment. Market-basket studies have found that, without working excessive
overtime hours, the minimum wage in many countries is not sufficient to meet
a worker’s basic needs.
Id.
52.
There is a strong legislative movement in the United States requiring
“living wages” for public sector workers as a procurement condition. See, e.g., Bruce
Nilssen, Living Wage Campaigns from a ‘Social Movement’ Perspective: The Miami
Case, 25 LAB. STUD. J. 29, 29 (2000).
53.
See ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, LIVING WAGE: MAKE IT A REALITY 1
(2009),
http://www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/resources/ETI%20Conference%
2008%20briefing%20paper%20%20Living%20wage.pdf.
54.
See Living Wage Standards, supra note 51. Some university licensee codes
of conduct also include “living wage” requirements. See, for example, the York
University (Toronto) Code, which includes the following language:
Licensees acknowledge that wages are essential to meeting employees’ basic
needs. Licensees shall pay employees at least the minimum wage required by
local law, the prevailing industry wage or living wage, whichever is higher, and
shall provide legally mandated benefits.
YORK UNIVERSITY, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR Licenses, art. 111-8, http://www.yorku.ca/
secretariat/licensing/Forms/CodeofConductForLicensees.pdf.
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wage standard.55 It rarely appears in internal codes of conduct, and
wage levels are not directly addressed in the ILO’s core conventions
at all, reflecting a lack of consensus on whether there should be some
universal standard. Thus, the living wage remains a highly contested
standard, with little corporate support; even corporations that have
come to support ILO core conventions in their internal codes of
conduct have resisted the living wage standard. For example, in
2006, the ETI suspended Levi-Strauss’s membership because the
company refused to endorse the living wage standard in the ETI base
code.56
The important point is that PLR may pressure employers to
adhere to standards that remain contested and that may effectively
undermine domestic labor policy strategies.57 If the living wage
standard became widely adopted as a measure of decent labor
practices, it could pressure employers in developing countries to pay
more than either national wage laws or local labor market conditions
would dictate. This may be good for the workers, but only if the
increase in wage costs does not cause foreign investors to downsize or
exit altogether in favor of cheaper labor elsewhere.
It is this kind of fine balancing that governments are expected to
engage in when determining domestic labor policies. As a result,
some economists and many politicians in developing countries oppose

55.
See FAIR LABOR ASS’N LIVING WAGE FORUM, BEYOND QUESTIONS OF
PRINCIPAL: EXPLORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LIVING WAGES IN TODAY’S GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2003), http://www.fairlabour.org/all/resources/livingwage/FLA_livingwage_
forum_report.pdf; Why Does the FLA Monitor for Minimum Wage and Not Living
Wage?, FAIR LABOR ASS’N, http://www.fairlabor.org/fla_affiliates_colleges_and_
universities_d3.html#Q10 (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (“Experience shows that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a region-specific living wage. . . . In light of this,
the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct, which is based on ILO standards, does not
include a living wage element.”); see also O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 11, 26 n.4
(explaining that the original union participants in the Apparel Industry Partnership
(AIP), which led to the FLA, withdrew in part due to their realization that whatever
code emerges from the process would not include a “living wage” requirement).
56.
For more information on Levi-Strauss’s suspension, see Sarah Butler,
Levi’s Suspended by Ethical Group in Living Wage Row, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 20,
2007, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/
retailing/article1294788.ece. In February 2007, following the suspension, Levi-Strauss
withdrew its membership in the ETI. Trading Off the Fairtrade Banner?, IRISH TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2007, at 17. See generally Make a Commitment to Paying a Living Wage,
CLEARINTHEHURDLES.ORG, http://www.clearingthehurdles.org/proposal/d1 (last visited
Sept. 26, 2010) (describing a survey of leading sportswear companies and the reasons
given by the companies why they would not support a “living wage” standard for their
suppliers).
57.
See David Weil & Carlos Mallo, Regulating Labour Standards via Supply
Chains: Combining Public/Private Interventions to Improve Workplace Compliance, 45
BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 791, 794 (2007) (“[Private labor regulation] systems are usually
detached from the traditional regulatory mechanisms in the nations where they
operate and consequently do not complement—and at worst undermine—those
governmental systems.”).
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the living wage movement and the PLR movement more generally.58
They argue that private labor regulation, such as a living wage
requirement for local producers, can throw off the delicate balancing
of interests that governments are expected to perform when setting
domestic policies.59 Legislation that seeks to legitimize or empower
PLR is similarly objectionable on this basis.
B. PLR May Seek to Produce Norms that Conflict with
Social Norms in the Foreign States
PLR might also produce—or at least seek to produce—workplace
norms that are inconsistent with the dominant social norms of the
communities in which the workplaces are situated.
In some
countries, for example, child labor is built into the fabric of society.60
While it may be possible to achieve widespread agreement that
bonded and forced child labor is wrong, in many developing countries,
child labor is both normalized and expected as a principal means of
earning sufficient income to ensure that a family’s basic human needs
are satisfied.61 These issues have helped shape the ILO’s careful
approach to child labor, which concentrates on the “worst forms of
child labor,” including slavery, child trafficking, bonded child labor,
prostitution, and dangerous work.62
PLR may produce labor norms that run head-on into prevailing
social norms and disturb the prevailing social order in harmful ways.
If PLR were to encourage MNCs to avoid contractors that use child
labor, it could deprive local families of a crucial source of income
without providing any alternative.63 It would not necessarily mean,
for example, that the children simply return to school, because there
may not be a school.64 Children may be forced to find other, more
harmful employment, or the children’s families may sink further into
poverty. This is a cautionary argument against encouraging PLR to

58.
See Basu, supra note 6, at 487 (arguing that many in the Third World are
understandably opposed to international labor standards reform, as is the author); see
also Paul Krugman, Moral Economics: What the Campaign for a Living Wage Is Really
About, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1998, at 43 (reviewing ROBERT POLLIN & STEPHANIE
LUCE, LIVING WAGE: WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE NEED IT (1998)).
59.
See generally Basu, supra note 6, at 488 (arguing that “at this stage
[international labor standards] are best left to individual nations”).
60.
Kaushik Basu, Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks
on International Labor Standards 3 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
2027, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=604927.
61.
See id. at 44–45 (explaining the extent to which child labor is “frowned
upon” varies substantially in relation to the social norms in different societies).
62.
International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), INT’L
LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/ipec/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
63.
See Basu, supra note 6, at 491 (noting that “parents typically do not send
their children to work out of sloth but out of desperation”).
64.
Id.
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tinker or alter complex industrial relations systems without a full
understanding of the components of that system and how they
interact with one another.65
C. Reliance by PLR Campaigns and Initiatives on Market
Forces is Inappropriate and Ineffective
A related objection is that the principal source of power upon
which most PLR initiatives and campaigns rely—consumer markets
and, to a lesser degree, investment markets—is an inappropriate tool
to address human rights concerns, including labor rights. Kevin
Kolben summarizes this objection:
Private initiatives and regulation . . . are primarily orientated toward
satisfying particular consumer and market demands.
They are
creations of corporations to address these demands, and as such lack
legitimacy and might be blind to some of the broader objectives of a
public labor law system. . . . Consumer preferences can be fickle—just
as consumers might like red pajamas today and blue pajamas
tomorrow, consumers might like labor rights today, but lose interest in
them tomorrow.66

Kaushik Basu is blunter in his objection to PLR initiatives that seek
to harness consumer and investor preferences in pursuit of improved
labor conditions in developing countries. He argues that they are
“deeply unfair” to the workers they are purporting to aid because,
inter alia, foreign market forces are incapable of addressing the
systemic causes of poor labor conditions in developing countries and
can cause responses by employers and MNCs that actually harm the
workers.67 For example, consumer boycotts can cause layoffs in a
factory without creating any alternative employment opportunities
for the laid-off workers.68 Accordingly, deploying Northern market
forces to influence labor conditions in developing countries is
unsustainable and potentially harmful to the very people it intends to
benefit.
This argument is tied up with claims that, in any event,
governments should be able to determine their own domestic labor
policies without interference by foreign governments or private
actors. According to this objection, foreign governments in particular
should not attempt to influence policy in foreign states. Wesley
Cragg states the argument this way:

65.
See generally Basu, supra note 6, at 492–93 (arguing that national
governments are best situated to address domestic labor practices because only they
can understand the complexities of the issues involved.).
66.
Kolben, supra note 5, at 229.
67.
Basu, supra note 6, at 493–94.
68.
See id. at 491 (criticizing a bill incentivizing other nations to keep children
out of their labor force as failing to recognize that “it is possible for children to suffer a
fate worse than labor, such as starvation”).
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The problem with democratic regimes is that their conception of ‘the
public’ whose interests they are justified in protecting and advancing
are national publics. When national governments seek to extend their
definitions of ‘the public interest’ beyond national geographical
boundaries, their definitions of ‘the public interest’ or what we have
described as the common good becomes unilateral . . . . Democratic
governments can only speak for and legitimately describe the common
interests of those who elect them.69

In these terms, the argument could be interpreted as a normative
claim that governments should not concern themselves with labor
practices outside of their direct legislative authority.70 However, the
argument also suggests that governments lack the capacity to know
or learn what is in the best interest of foreign citizens, and therefore,
they should not attempt to influence foreign labor policies.
D. PLR Legitimizes the Substitution of Private or “Self”
Regulation for State Regulation
PLR can also undermine or supplant national labor regulation by
legitimizing a system of governance based principally in selfregulation and market forces. Adelle Blackett argues that corporate
self-regulation initiatives tend to supplant national labor laws rather
than coexist with them, particularly if the initiatives are intended to
apply in places where national labor laws are nonexistent or not
enforced, such as in export processing zones:
The cumulative result of MNCs in many EPZs [export processing
zones] is the de facto deregulation of labor relations in these zones.
Perched above these deregulated spaces is a new form of legality—selfregulation of labour standards by actors with annual revenues that far
exceed the gross domestic product (GDP) of most developing countries
in which they are based. This new form of legality emphasizes not the
fixed context of the domestic workplace, but rather the increasingly
dynamic notion of the transborder product in the new international
division of labour. When seen in the context of EPZs, therefore, selfregulatory initiatives fit logically within the framework of
transnational consumerism through trade, in which Western
consumers and MNCs seek to replace the state—and the social partners
themselves (that is, local employers and workers)—as the new
regulators.71

69.
Wesley Cragg, Ethics Codes: The Regulatory Norms of a Globalized
Society?, in ETHICS CODES, CORPORATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION
353, 359 (Wesley Cragg ed., 2005).
70.
However, that is not what Cragg intends. He argues that neither national
governments nor private industry have the authority or ability to act as regulators in
defining what and how norms should be applied within MNCs in various countries.
Cragg, supra note 49, at 211–13. He argues that a “cooperative” approach to
governance is needed that includes a role for governments, industry, and civil society.
Id.
71.
Blackett, supra note 45, at 124–25.
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Peer Zumbansen makes the same point about labor codes of conduct
by arguing that they “embrace company-level regulation of workrelated issues while often rejecting union involvement or other forms
of organized worker representation. As such, voluntary codes bear
the danger of cutting the ties between the worker and the outside
system of institutional safeguards.”72
Blackette and Zumbansen are primarily concerned with
corporate self-regulation and other initiatives developed and governed
by industry. Many PLR initiatives and campaigns involve unions and
various other actors who are antagonistic to industry in defining,
monitoring, and implementing standards.73 Therefore, it would be
inaccurate to associate all PLR with corporate self-regulation.
Nevertheless, the fundamental point remains the same: the absence
of the state and its power to coerce the other industrial actors means
that PLR envisions a completely different sort of industrial relations
system in which relative power is determined by consumer,
investment, labor, and product markets.74 The absence of the state
as a countervailing power to capital benefits the more powerful actors
in the labor relationship: employers and MNCs.

72.
Peer Zumbansen, The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor
Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 261, 295 (2006); see also Arthurs, supra note 8, at
30 (arguing that corporate self-regulation in the form of codes of conduct “facilitate or
normalize the shift of power from unions and workers to employers” by “masking or
cosmeticizing the decline of state labor law”); Kolben, supra note 5, at 228–29 (“Critics
[of PLR] are concerned that private regulation threatens and possibly undermines
public regulation.”).
73.
For example, the Workers’ Rights Consortium, see Governance, WORKERS’
RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://www.workersrights.org/about/govern.asp (last visited Sept.
26, 2010), and the Ethical Trading Initiative, see Our Members, ETHICAL TRADING
INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/our-members (last visited Sept. 26,
2010), both leading private organizations engaged in monitoring supply chain labor
practices, include in their governance structures actors who have traditionally been
antagonistic to corporate practices, including unions, human rights organizations,
students, and academics. See generally Alan Ross, Introduction to NO SWEAT: FASHION,
FREE TRADE, AND THE RIGHTS OF GARMENT WORKERS 30–31 (Andrew Ross ed., 1997)
(briefly describing the history of unions in the fashion industry); O’Rourke, supra note
10 (comparatively assessing systems of nongovernmental enforcement of regulations).
74.
See Harry Arthurs, Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the Global
Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation, in
LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND
POSSIBILITIES 487 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002).
[O]ne might argue, half a voluntary code is better than no regulation. But while
this argument may have merit, it does not address a further concern of labour,
human rights advocates, and social movements: that to acknowledge the
potential of corporate good intentions and to accept employer self-regulation
even as a transitional measure is to legitimate the existing global economic
system and its ultimately unpalatable manifestations in workplaces and
communities around the world.
Id.
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Underlying this line of argument is the premise that stable,
effective industrial relations systems ultimately require a strong local
government prepared to bolster and control worker power through
protective labor legislation that facilitates independent union
representation and other labor standards.75 Insofar as PLR envisions
and legitimizes a system of private ordering that largely or
completely ignores this central role of the state and the crucial role of
power relations in industrial relations, PLR may be doomed to failure
beyond the occasional band-aid fix. Even worse, it may impede the
development of more effective state participation by distracting
attention from it.76 This argument suggests that encouraging PLR
initiatives and campaigns through domestic regulation is the wrong
approach because PLR tends to perpetuate a dysfunctional model of
labor governance in which disproportionate power rests in the hands
of corporations and employers who are unmotivated to effect any real,
sustainable change that empowers workers.77
E. PLR Shifts Responsibility for Defining Appropriate
Standards from States to Unaccountable
Private Actors
Another criticism of PLR is that it tends to delegate
responsibility for determining what standards are appropriate to
private actors who ultimately are unrepresentative and
unaccountable to anyone.
The form of this argument differs
depending upon the type of PLR initiative or campaign. For example,
initiatives such as codes of conduct that a corporation or industry
develops and implements without the participation of other external
actors, such as unions or NGOs—referred to above as corporate selfregulation78—earn criticism for merging the “regulator” and the
“agent” and ignoring the need for a legitimate countervailing power to
capital in the form of state regulation or collective bargaining.79

75.
The argument that local actors need to be involved in efforts to improve
local labor conditions is one made by many authors and developed further in Part IV.
See, e.g., Basu, supra note 6, at 488; Sean Cooney, A Broader Role for the
Commonwealth in Eradicating Sweatshops?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 290, 332–33 (2004);
Kolben, supra note 5, at 217; Jill Murray, The Sound of One Hand Clapping? The
“Ratcheting Labour Standards” Proposal and International Labour Law 8 (Faculty of
Law the Univ. of Melbourne Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 24, 2002).
76.
See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
77.
See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
78.
See generally Black, supra note 8 (commenting on the various definitions
and applications of “self” regulation).
79.
Arthurs, supra note 74, at 482, 487.
The codes of corporate conduct and their enforcement mechanisms signify a
crucial theoretical departure from traditional industrial relations principles.
They are essentially an extension of management power to self-regulate, but in
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These arguments recognize, correctly, that corporations have little
interest in building this countervailing power themselves.
Corporations usually perceive self-regulation as an alternative to
these other forms of countervailing power. Thus, as Blackett argues,
“[t]o accept that [MNCs] are indeed acting as regulators over
particular places puts the normative question—who should
regulate—in stark relief.”80
When private actors rather than corporations promulgate multistakeholder codes and other initiatives, the argument often expands
to include attacks on the legitimacy and accountability of those
actors. Unions are attacked on the basis that they represent the
interests of a narrow core of relatively privileged workers that most
often does not include the sorts of workers that are usually targeted
by PLR initiatives and campaigns.81
Furthermore, NGOs are
attacked as being unaccountable to anyone, or for being unduly
influenced by the ever-pressing need to preserve donors or expand
their donor base.82 Blackett explains:
The channels of accountability for NGOs are sometimes nonexistent. . . . [R]elations between local civil society groups and
transnational NGOs may themselves be problematic. Indeed, some
NGOs need to safeguard close relationships with international donor
agencies; this concern might affect their local delivery. The gulf
between NGOs in the North and those in the South is further widened
by inequities of power, limited access to technology and resources, the
prevalence of the English language, and divergent interests. Some
attention to the implications of these disparities is therefore warranted.
Yet, the labor rights advocacy surrounding codes of corporate conduct
emphasizes NGO representation without focusing on the representative
character of the groups that are engaged in advocacy.83

A common theme in these “legitimacy” arguments is concern
about the absence of voice and participation by the factory workers
who are the intended beneficiaries of most PLR initiatives and
campaigns84 or of local NGOs and unions, who at least can claim to
have some direct link to the workers on the ground.85

a domain that would traditionally be addressed through one of two means:
protective legislation adopted by the state, or collective bargaining.
Blackett, supra note 40, at 422.
80.
Blackett, supra note 40, at 432.
81.
See, e.g., id. at 437.
82.
See, e.g., Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L.
197, 197 (2002).
83.
Blackett, supra note 40, at 438.
84.
See, e.g., Arthurs, supra note 74, at 487; Blackett, supra note 40, at 438.
85.
See Blackett, supra note 40, at 437 (stating that NGOs can at least claim to
represent those who suffer violations of certain fundamental human rights);
Zumbansen, supra note 72, at 295 (“[C]orporate codes of conduct embrace companylevel regulation of work-related issues while often rejecting union involvement or other
forms of worker representation.”).
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Unsurprisingly, these arguments often conclude with the common
prescription that a system of governance that targets supply chain
labor practices must ultimately involve participation by local workers
and unions and by local government authorities in the form of decent
labor regulation.86 This point is discussed below in Part IV.
F. The Costs of TDLR Would Outweigh Any Potential Benefits
Lastly, any new form of business regulation today will be
confronted with the argument that it imposes costs on business that
outweigh any potential benefits. Often this argument is accompanied
by dire predictions of job losses and increased consumer prices,
among other adverse effects, particularly if the targeted activity can
be transplanted to other markets or is a component of global business
activity.87 Certainly, the trend in recent years has been away from
new forms of business regulation, particularly regulation of labor
practices.88 Therefore, any government that attempts to introduce
new regulation of domestic businesses that targets foreign labor
practices should anticipate a hostile response from the business
community and be prepared to justify the regulation on a cost–benefit
analysis.
If the regulation targets workplaces in other countries, part of
the “benefit” will take the form of a moral argument that it is the
responsibility of “rich” countries to improve working conditions in
“poor” countries or that domestic consumers demand and are entitled
to goods that are not made in sweatshops. These arguments face
several difficulties. First, the expected benefit of the regulation to
foreign workers will often be obscure or speculative. Second, a
coordination problem may create competitive problems for companies
subject to the regulation: if the requirements apply only to companies
within the jurisdictional grasp of the regulating state, then

86.
See Arthurs, supra note 74, at 487; see also Blackett, supra note 40, at 432–
33 (“By diverting attention to management monitoring systems, and away from classic
voice mechanisms through labor management dispute settlement machinery, selfregulatory initiatives run the risk of supplanting rather than buttressing democratic
participation in the work force.”).
87.
For example, manufacturers and retailers in Canada responded to am
NGO’s proposal for a law requiring public disclosure of the identity and location of
supplier factories for apparel sold in Canada by arguing that the law would threaten
the viability of Canadian business. See THE CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., STUDY OF A
PROPOSAL (AND ITS ALTERNATIVES) TO AMEND THE TEXTILE LABELLING AND
ADVERTISING REGULATIONS: APPLYING THE CONFERENCE BOARD'S OPTIMAL POLICY MIX
FRAMEWORK 17 (2003).
88.
See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1527 (2002) (“[P]rivate sector labor law—the law that governs
workers’ efforts to advance their own shared interests through self-organization and
collective protest, pressure, negotiation, and agreement with employers—has shrunk in
its reach and its significance, and is clearly ailing.”).
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companies will have an incentive to avoid that jurisdictional grasp,
perhaps by exiting the consumer market. For example, an American
law that obligates companies that sell products in the United States
to take certain steps to ensure decent supply chain labor practices
could theoretically cause companies to pull out of the American
consumer market.89
If even some of the companies affected by the regulation exercise
the exit option, this could have negative effects on the economy of the
regulating state or on consumers in that state through fewer choices
or higher prices. Furthermore, enforcing requirements that apply to
extraterritorial behavior may prove extremely difficult: factories in
foreign states probably would not welcome American inspectors.
Therefore, the benefits of TDLR that targets foreign labor practices
may prove extremely difficult to measure.
III. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TRANSNATIONAL DOMESTIC
LABOR REGULATION
The preceding section described serious objections to PLR, which
by inference challenge the TDLR project that would seek to harness
PLR to improve labor conditions in foreign states. Those arguments
might dissuade governments from exploring TDLR.
Certainly,
proponents of TDLR and PLR need to respond to the criticisms. This
section explores what those responses might be.
It is important to be clear on the central issue. The question is
not whether there should or should not be PLR. PLR already exists,
having developed largely without the involvement of states. There is
little indication that codes of conduct, private monitoring, multistakeholder initiatives, and market-based publicity campaigns are
going to fade away any time soon. Instead, the question is whether
PLR can be put to use in ways that advance policies of the
governments of developed countries, such as reducing labor abuses in
foreign states.
Furthermore, because there is no generic model of TDLR, it is
not possible to make sweeping generalizations about what impact
TDLR is likely to have on foreign labor practices. For example, an
American law conferring import trade tariff benefits on foreign
products made in compliance with specified labor standards might
have a very different impact on labor conditions in those foreign
states than a law requiring merely that American-based corporations

89.
This seems more realistic when the regulating state has a small consumer
market. It is highly unlikely, for example, that a company that sells consumer goods
would forego the enormous markets of the United States or the European Community
just to avoid a regulation aimed at improving supply chain labor practices, unless that
regulation threatened the firm’s very survival.
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adopt and publish a code of conduct for all of their suppliers. Both
types of regulation would meet our definition of TDLR because they
are domestic laws attempting to influence foreign labor practices, but
they create different incentives and risks. One model of TDLR might
lead to greater compliance with host-state labor laws, while another
produces no result at all, and a third leads to improvements that
exceed standards in local labor laws. The argument that PLR and
TDLR will undermine comparative advantage, for example, does not
apply equally to all three of those scenarios. Similarly, the costs
associated with one model of TDLR may be dramatically different
than those of another model. The point is that the power of the
arguments in the preceding section may rise or fall depending upon
the particular design of the TDLR.
Finally, it is important to recognize that, while improving labor
practices may be the ultimate objective of PLR and TDLR, their
impact may be subtle at first and not immediately recognizable from
outside the affected organizations. One of the lessons of de-centered
regulatory theory is that legal signals can influence behavior
indirectly over time by influencing the norm-creating processes
within institutions and subsystems. Julia Black makes the point, for
example, that “one of the roles of reflexive law is to set the decision
making procedures within organizations in such a way that the goals
of public policy are achieved.”90 While PLR and the activities and
role of private labor activists have been widely studied, relatively
little research has been directed at how organizations, including
MNCs, actually perceive and respond to risks posed by PLR. The
arguments in the preceding Part may undervalue the potential
contribution of PLR and TDLR by largely ignoring their potential
impact on the ways in which global supply chains are governed. This
Part develops these themes more fully.

90.
Black, supra note 8, at 126; see, e.g., Daniel Fiorino, Rethinking
Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 441, 448 (1999) (discussing the use of reflexive law as an alternative to direct
regulation of primary behavior); Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227, 1267 (1995) (noting that a strategy of reflexive law is “channeling
communications within the organizational structure of social institutions” with the
expectation that influencing how information is gathered and used in an organization
can influence how organizations act in response to that information); Colin Scott,
Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State 9 (Nat’l
Europe Ctr., Working Paper No. 100, 2003) (“[The] modest conception of law’s
capabilities [in reflexive law theory] has led to a concern with targeting the internal
management systems of regulated entities in order to secure compliance with
regulatory goals.”).
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A. The Sovereign State and Labor Practice Governance
The argument that PLR and TDLR are forms of Northern
protectionism draws on a vision of national governments that possess
a right to determine what labor standards are appropriate within
their borders, free from interference from “outside” actors. However,
this is an overly simplistic and distorted view of how workplace
norms are determined in practice today, at least in those domestic
factories that form part of the global apparel supply chains. Factory
owners who might otherwise ignore unenforced national labor laws
might nevertheless find value in complying with those laws, or with
codes of conduct, if doing so will attract or maintain orders from MNC
customers. Practices that violate local health and safety laws, but
that local officials have ignored for years, might be corrected in
response to private monitoring. Employees dismissed for union
activities might be reinstated in response to PLR campaigns.91
Personal relationships and interactions at the factory level might
influence labor practice norms within global supply chains in the
usual ways that labor law and industrial relations scholars have long
recognized.92 Even personal relationships between MNC-employed
buyers, production managers, and local factory owners can more
significantly impact investment decisions than concerns about labor
costs and labor regulation.93
In fact, recent studies find that labor costs and labor regulation
play a relatively minor role in influencing sourcing decisions, at least
in decisions between competing developing countries.94 In a widely
cited study, the OECD found that there was “no evidence that low-

91.
For example, Montreal-based Gildan Activewear recently agreed to
reemploy workers dismissed after they attempted to organize an independent union at
a company-owned factory in Honduras. This decision followed an extended campaign
against Gildan waged by a variety of labor groups and media outlets, including
investigations by the FLA and the Workers’ Rights Consortium, both of which
confirmed that Gildan discriminated against the workers for union activities. Gildan
Agrees to Corrective Action Plan, MAQUILA SOLIDARITY NETWORK (Jan. 24, 2005),
http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/gildan/more; see also Konrad Yakabuski, Ethical Tack
Pays Off for Gildan, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Dec. 7, 2005, at B2.
92.
Harry Arthurs, Understanding Labor Law: The Debate Over ‘Industrial
Pluralism,’ 38 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 83 (1985).
93.
See Vokmar Gessner, Richard P. Appelbaum & William L.F. Felstiner,
Introduction: The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions, in RULES AND
NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Richard P.
Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001) (emphasizing the merits of relational models of
contracting over traditional “discrete exchange” models).
94.
See, e.g., JODY HEYMANN & ALISON EARLE, RAISING THE GLOBAL FLOOR 55
(2010) (describing studies finding that among the countries most competitive in the
international business environment, all had somewhat extensive labor protections in
place, though the extent of those protections differed somewhat from country to
country).
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[labor-]standards countries enjoy a better global export performance
than high-standards countries.”95 These results warrant caution in
accepting the argument that PLR and TDLR will undermine the
comparative advantage of developing states. Even if PLR and TDLR
were to lead to improvements in labor practices within developing
states, it does not follow that these improvements will cause MNCs to
disinvest from those states. Factors other than labor costs, such as
the demands of the quota systems governing the international
apparel industry,96 often prove more important than local labor laws
to the investment decisions of MNCs. Investment decisions are also
affected by factory capacity, unit price, technology, retailer demands,
intellectual property, marketing strategies, product quality, delivery
time reliability, worker skills, local infrastructure, tax rates, and the
quality of domestic property and contract law regimes.97
Thus, the link between the roles of national labor laws and
investment decisions is tenuous. National governments of host states
(states in which the factories are located) still have influence over
domestic labor practices, and those practices factor into firms’
investment decisions.
However, to suggest that national
governments must have a monopoly on the task of defining local labor
practice norms to attract and retain foreign direct investment is to
ignore what happens in practice. PLR initiatives and campaigns
already play a role in influencing normative labor practices and will
continue to do so in the future. According to Heyina Dashwood:

95.
Emp’t, Labour and Soc. Affairs Comm. & Trade Comm. of the OECD, Joint
Report on Trade, Employment, and Labor Standards, in ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., TRADE, EMPLOYMENT, AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE
WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9, 12 (1996) (citing a series of studies,
including the OECD study, that tend to indicate that labor standards play a minimal
unknown role in determining international competitiveness); see also Langille, supra
note 15, at 39–42 (discussing the OECD finding that “core labor standards do not play
a significant role in shaping trade performance”); see generally David Charney,
Regulatory Competition and the Global Coordination of Labor Standards, 3 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 281 (2000) (analyzing regulatory competition in labor standards); Kryvoi,
supra note 5 (discussing debate regarding whether low core labor standards are linked
to economic growth); Alan Hyde, A Stag Hunt Account and Defense of Transnational
Labor Standards: A Preliminary Look at the Problem 1–4 (Cornell Legal Studies
Research, Working Paper No. 06–008, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896362 (describing studies finding no link between low
levels of labor standards and levels of trade and inward capital investment).
96.
See RIVOLI, supra note 15, at 164–65 (discussing the effects of quota
systems on exporters).
97.
See generally ANGELA HALE & JANE WILLS, THREADS OF LABOUR: GARMENT
INDUSTRY SUPPLY CHAINS FROM THE WORKERS’ PERSPECTIVE (2005) (providing an indepth account of the structure of global supply chains in the garment industry); Larry
Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Law
Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1751–63 (2007)
(describing several of the factors that inform Wal-Mart’s investment decisions).
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To argue that there is no scope for voluntary initiatives, and that
corporate responsibility should be strictly a state regulatory affair, is
unhelpful. An either/or approach to state regulation (that is, hard law)
and voluntary initiatives (namely soft law) runs the risk of being
overtaken by events. What is actually occurring is a hybrid situation,
with state regulation prevailing in some areas along with voluntary
initiatives in other areas.98

Bob Hepple describes this development as “a shift from public to
private regulation,” wherein national and international labor laws
interact with privately developed codes and rules up and down the
supply chain.99
The question that should be asked is not whether PLR initiatives
and campaigns undermine some theoretical notion of state
sovereignty over the governance of labor policy and practices. Rather,
the question should be how PLR interacts with national labor laws,
labor policies, and the many other factors that influence supply chain
labor practices. The answer to this question may demonstrate how to
influence those complex interactions to produce different labor
practices.
B. PLR and TDLR Might Bolster Government Sovereignty
by Improving Compliance with National Labor Laws
In assessing these interrelations, it is important to adopt a
realistic and pragmatic understanding of the role and impact of PLR
initiatives and campaigns. While one set of PLR critics argue that its
impact is potentially devastating to the economies of developing
countries because it will destroy comparative advantage and thrust
the workers into even more dire conditions,100 another set of critics
argue that PLR is a corporate-led smokescreen that will never have
any meaningful impact on actual labor practices.101 Both claims
cannot be correct all of the time.
In fact though, both claims may be correct some of the time.
PLR might occasionally cause an employer to layoff workers, who will
then be worse off if no alternative source of income exists.

98.
HEVINA DASHWOOD, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS, in JOHN KIRTON & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, HARD
CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND
SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 189, 189 (2004).
99.
Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 347, 350, 353 (1999).
100.
See, e.g., Basu, supra note 6, at 493–94 (arguing that private social
sanctions are imperfect, causing disproportionate pain to some, such as alreadydisadvantaged workers, and too little pain to others).
101.
See, e.g., Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking, in FUNG, O’ROURKE & SABEL,
supra note 48, at 54; Jeff Ballinger, The Corporate Social Responsibility Farce,
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeff-ballinger/thecorporate-social-resp_b_46906.html.
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Alternatively, PLR may have no impact whatsoever on an employer
that is prepared to violate labor laws.
The challenge for a
government considering TDLR that would harness PLR to reduce
labor abuses is to design a regulatory regime that produces the
positive effects on labor practices (i.e., improved compliance with
labor laws) without also producing the negative effects (i.e.,
unemployment and worsening of conditions).
While this may prove to be a very challenging mission, it would
be wrong to claim that all TDLR that seeks to harness PLR will
produce negative effects for the targeted workers and foreign
governments. PLR could help both. For example, if PLR encouraged
better compliance with local, applicable labor laws when the hoststate government was having difficulty enforcing its own laws, then
this would presumably benefit both the workers and the government.
The same is true of ratified international conventions. By ratifying
an international labor convention, a government promises to bring
the standards of the convention into effect domestically. Thus,
insofar as PLR (perhaps bolstered by TDLR) encourages greater
domestic compliance with these standards, it supports the host state’s
policies.
Admittedly, sometimes governments do not want their labor
laws to be enforced and do not intend to actually bring an
international convention into effect. In these cases, nonenforcement
and non-implementation are de facto policy decisions designed to
encourage investment or achieve some other objective.102 However,
the argument that states should be able to systemically and
deliberately ignore their own laws or ratify conventions only to
disregard them, is deserving of little moral or legal support. Labor
laws are a signal to the industrial relations actors and to the local
and global community of a government’s values. There is little value
in deferring to a supposed right of governments to publicly convey one
set of values and then to pursue different ones in practice. Holding
governments to the laws they have passed improves transparency
and enhances democracy and dialogue between states and private
actors about what labor policies are appropriate. These are strong
reasons for supporting PLR that encourages compliance with
domestic labor laws and with international conventions ratified by
national governments.

102.
See Blackett, supra note 40 (noting the de facto practice of suspending
national labor laws within export processing zones in order to attract investment);
Kimberley Elliott & Richard Freeman, The Role Global Labor Standards Could Play in
Addressing Basic Needs, in GLOBAL INEQUALITIES AT WORK 320 (Jody Heymann ed.,
2003) (noting that Bangledesh denied unions access into their export processing zones
because they feared they would deter direct inward foreign investment); see generally
Kryvoi, supra note 5 (discussing examples of governments that violated ILO
Conventions in their pursuit of other state objectives).
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Therefore, an American law that encourages greater compliance
with labor standards that a foreign government had itself promised to
enforce would not impede that state’s sovereignty. Instead, it would
aid that state’s efforts to enforce its own standards. This is an
important point because PLR initiatives often encourage compliance
with domestic labor laws. Indeed, respect for national labor laws is
one of the most common requirements found in corporate codes of
conduct.103 Labor activists that monitor and campaign against
domestic labor law violations can pressure MNCs and local employers
to improve legal compliance. Ronnie Lipschutz argues that in this
way, “international activism,” in the form of corporate campaigns and
private monitoring, can help developing states “gain control of
regulatory policy and effectively enforce applicable laws on an
national basis as they had not been able to do before.”104 Therefore,
he argues, PLR initiatives can “enhance state sovereignty with
respect to global capital.”105 Kolben argues similarly that PLR
measures often “boost public regulatory capacity” in developing
countries.106
One reason why this is particularly the case in relation to labor
law is that private campaigns have the potential to discourage the
practice of “cutting and running,” which occurs when a MNC cancels
supplier contracts at factories or in jurisdictions where labor practices
have improved, either because of new laws or because employees have
exercised legal rights like the right to form an independent union.107
If private initiatives can pressure MNCs to remain in a factory after
labor conditions improve or to continue to invest in a state when
national labor laws or enforcement improve, employers and states
will be more likely to make improvements.
For example, in 2002, a campaign by labor and shareholder
activists targeted the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), Canada’s oldest
and largest retailer. The campaign criticized HBC’s decision to pull
its orders from factories in Lesotho after NGOs discovered serious

103.
See Rhys Jenkins, The Political Economy of Codes of Conduct, in
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOR RIGHTS: CODES OF CONDUCT IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 21 (Rhys Jenkins et al. eds., 2002) (listing compliance with laws as the
second most common requirement cited in corporate codes of conduct).
104.
Ronnie Lipschutz, Doing Well by Doing Good? Transnational Regulatory
Campaigns, Social Activism, and Impacts on State Sovereignty, in SOVEREIGNTY
UNDER CHALLENGE: HOW GOVERNMENTS RESPOND 294 (John Montgomery & Nathan
Glazer eds., 2002).
105.
Id.
106.
Kolben, supra note 5, at 233–34.
107.
See Richard Appelbaum et al., Fighting Sweatshops: Problems of Enforcing
Global Labor Standards 10–11 (Aug. 16, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2693m5pn (stating that companies will often prefer to
“cut and run”—abandon a problematic factory rather than risk bad publicity due to the
factory’s continued operation).
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violation of Lesotho’s labor laws.108 The campaign employed several
tactics, including organizing informational leaf-letting protests
outside of the HBC flagship store in Toronto’s downtown.109 In May
2002, citing the company’s actions in Lesotho, a group of HBC’s
institutional investors introduced a resolution calling on HBC to
require suppliers to adhere to core ILO labor rights and to monitor
and publicly report on compliance with those standards.110 The
resolution garnered over 36 percent support, which was at the time
the highest level of support ever recorded for a Canadian shareholder
proposal targeting “social” practices.111
Later that year, the NGO Maquila Solidarity Network named
HBC the 2002 “Sweatshop Retailer of the Year.”112 The media
release explained that “cutting off suppliers whenever workers report
abuses discourages workers from acting as whistleblowers, and
virtually guarantees that sweatshop practices will be buried rather
than addressed.”113 Shortly after this campaign, HBC introduced a
new supplier factory monitoring system that incorporates ILO core
conventions and includes a “Strike Three” policy, which emphasizes
exit as a final step only after the company exhausts efforts to achieve
compliance with its internal code of conduct. 114
The internal supplier factory monitoring systems of many MNCs
in the apparel industry today include remedial plans that purport to
allow cancelling a supplier contract only as a final measure.
Consequently, MNCs are required to first exhaust attempts to
remedy the problem with the local factory management.115 Some

108.
Lesotho Workers Win Union Recognition, No Thanks to Hudson’s Bay,
MAQUILA SOLIDARITY NETWORK (Dec. 12, 2002), http://old.maquilasolidarity.org/
campaigns/hbc/index.htm [hereinafter Lesotho Workers Win Union Recognition].
109.
How Lesotho Garment Workers Won Respect for Their Rights, MAQUILA
SOLIDARITY NETWORK (Mar. 2003), http://old.maquilasolidarity.org/campaigns/hbc/
update_mar2003.htm; Doorey, Who Made That?, supra note 3, at 403–04.
110.
Id.
111.
Hollie Shaw, Hudson's Bay Wants World Labour Rules: Retailers Group
Would Combat Sweat Shops, NAT’L POST, June 13, 2003, at FP4; Shareholder Vote at
HBC Sets Record, FORUM, June 2002, at 2, http://www.corostrandberg.com/pdfs/
June2002Forum.pdf; Press Release, Shareholders Ass’n for Research and Educ.,
Shareholder Group Calls on Hudson’s Bay to Report on Sweatshop Abuses in Lesotho
(May 14, 2002) (on file with author).
112.
Sweatshop Retailer of the Year Announced, MAQUILA SOLIDARITY NETWORK
(Dec. 19, 2002), http://old.maquilasolidarity.org/campaigns/awards/press2002.htm.
113.
Id.
114.
Ethical
Sourcing:
Monitoring
Our
Supply
Chain,
HBC.COM,
http://www.hbc.com/hbc/ hbc_csr_eng_06/es_monitoring.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2010).
115.
Accord GAP INC., 2005–2006 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 25 (2006),
http://www.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/csr/documents/2005-2006_Social_Responsibility_
Report.pdf.
All garment factories seeking to produce internally-designed [sic] and branded
apparel for Gap, Banana Republic and Old Navy will continue to receive initial
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multi-stakeholder initiatives similarly encourage remediation as a
first step before cancellation of orders.116 This development largely
derives from the sustained efforts of stakeholder activist campaigns
over the past fifteen years. These campaigns emphasized the
harmful effects of cut-and-run policies and pressured MNCs to use
their clout to encourage positive change in factories through
engagement rather than exit.117
The value of encouraging compliance with national laws may
seem marginal if we accept that nation-states are under pressure to
weaken those laws in order to retain and attract investment.118
However, the labor laws on the books in many countries are quite

inspection visits prior to the placement of any production orders. In certain
narrowly-defined [sic] instances, however, garment factories that have resolved
all identified major issues may be granted a one-time, conditional approval to
produce a special “rush” or “chase” order, even though the factory may still
have a few minor issues to resolve. It is important to note that this conditional
approval will be short-term, and the factory will not be able to produce
additional orders for any Gap Inc. brands until all remaining issues have been
resolved . . . .
Id.
116.

See, e.g., WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT art. VII.

VII. Remediation: Remedies herein apply to violations which occur after the
Effective Date of the Code.
A. If a Licensee has failed to self-correct a violation of the Code, the University
will consult with the Licensee (for itself and on behalf of its contractors,
subcontractors, or manufacturers) to determine appropriate corrective action.
B. The remedy will, at a minimum, include requiring the licensee to take all
steps necessary to correct such violations including, without limitation:
1. Paying all applicable back wages found due to workers who manufactured
the licensed articles.
2. Reinstatement of any worker found to have been unlawfully dismissed.
C. If agreement on corrective action is not reached, and/or the action does not
result in correction of the violation within a specified reasonable time period,
the University reserves the right to
1. require that the Licensee terminate its relationship with any contractor,
subcontractor, or manufacturer that continues to conduct its business in
violation of the Code, and/or
2. terminate its relationship with any Licensee that continues to conduct its
business in violation of the Code.
D. In either event, the University will provide the Licensee with thirty (30)
days written notice of termination. In order to ensure the reasonable and
consistent application of this provision, the University will seek advice from the
Worker Rights Consortium regarding possible corrective measures and
invocation of options 1 and 2 above.
Id.
117.
See discussion supra notes 108–11 (regarding Hudson’s Bay Company).
118.
See Hepple, supra note 99, at 361 (arguing that a “weakness” of codes of
conduct is their “reliance . . . on national labor laws at a time when national
governments have been disempowered by globalization”).

988

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

[Vol. 43:953

decent; unfortunately, these laws are sometimes systemically
unenforced.119 This noncompliance creates value in a private system
that encourages greater compliance with existing laws. Moreover, in
the process of encouraging greater compliance with existing national
labor laws, PLR initiatives and campaigns can call attention to the
difference between states that maintain weak laws and those that fail
to enforce relatively decent laws.
To the factory worker, this may seem like a distinction without a
difference. However, it can be important in shaping public discourse
and PLR strategies regarding the decisions of MNCs to invest in
particular countries. If the problem results from weak enforcement of
relatively decent laws, MNCs can be pressured to lead by example
and ensure legal compliance notwithstanding the state’s failure to
enforce its laws.120 If the problem results from inadequate laws (such
as when a state prohibits independent unions or waives the
application of laws in particular geographic spaces), the nature of the
criticism and range of responses change. MNCs can be encouraged to
decline state offers to operate free of local labor laws, and new tactics
can be considered, such as filing ILO complaints and waging
campaigns to pressure the governments to improve their laws.
C. The Modest Impact of PLR Initiatives and Campaigns
on Labor Practices and Foreign Inward Investment
Of course, if PLR actually increases compliance with local laws,
it could make factories in that jurisdiction less desirable to companies
that prefer a system in which their suppliers can violate labor laws
with impunity, and these companies might search for suppliers in
other countries. However, empirical evidence raises doubts that this
would occur frequently enough to negatively impact inward foreign
investment. For example, the OECD study mentioned earlier in this
Article included the following findings:
! That “there is no evidence that low-standards countries enjoy a better
global export performance than high-standards countries”;
! that “concerns expressed by certain developing countries that
[compliance with] core standards would negatively affect their
economic performance or their international competitive position are
unfounded”; and

119.
Blackett, supra note 40, at 426.
120.
For example, the MSN campaign targeting the Hudson’s Bay Company
sought to persuade HBC to pressure its suppliers in Lesotho to comply with that
country’s existing labor laws. See discussion supra notes 108–11.
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! that “it is theoretically possible that the observance of core standards
would strengthen the long-term economic performance of all
countries.”121

In the apparel industry in particular, Robert Pollen, Justine
Burns, and James Heintz found recently that “there is no relationship
between wage and employment growth in considering the individual
country evidence for the global apparel industry.”122 Indeed, the
OECD’s study suggests that improving working conditions may make
individual factories and geographic regions more attractive as
investment options.123 Presumably, continual increases in labor costs
would eventually erode the comparative advantage of developing
states, and this erosion could cause MNCs to consider countries with
cheaper labor markets. However, empirical evidence indicates that
this point is not easily reached. While it is possible to find instances
in which PLR initiatives and campaigns have encouraged greater
compliance with domestic labor laws,124 it is more difficult to find
examples where PLR has caused labor costs to rise beyond what the
applicable laws or prevailing market levels require.
For example, as previously noted, many PLR initiatives require
respect for freedom of association. However, in China independent
unions are illegal.125 If Chinese employers began recognizing and
bargaining with independent unions as a result of pressure from PLR
initiatives, this would directly contradict state policy.126 In theory, it
could lead to higher labor standards in China, which in turn could
make China less attractive to MNCs. However, even if we accept that
China should have the right to deny its citizens the right to freely
associate (a claim which obviously is contested), there is no evidence
that Chinese factory owners are in fact recognizing independent
unions because of pressure from PLR.
Similarly, the living wage requirement in some PLR initiatives
appears to aim specifically at raising labor costs above prevailing

121.
Emp’t, Labour and Soc. Affairs Comm. & Trade Comm. of the OECD, supra
note 95, at 12–13.
122.
Robert Pollin et al., Global Apparel Production and Sweatshop Labour: Can
Raising Retail Prices Finance Living Wages?, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 153, 169 (2004).
123.
Accord ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 95, at 202
(“Practitioners of [socially responsible investing] hope that by steering capital towards
what are deemed to be socially responsible firms and away from those deemed to be
socially irresponsible, they can wield a positive influence . . . .”).
124.
For example, when MSN targeted HBC for failing to pressure Lesotho
suppliers to comply with domestic labor laws, it also approached Gap Inc. which used
the same suppliers as HBC. Gap entered into negotiations with the suppliers that
culminated in the employer permitting union organizers access to the factory, as
required by Lesotho labor laws. See Lesotho Workers Win Union Recognition, supra
note 108.
125.
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 41–48.
126.
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 41–48.
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market levels and legal minimums.127 In theory, therefore, the living
wage requirement could price some factories out of the market by
effectively eliminating already-low profit margins. Again, however,
no evidence was uncovered in the economics, human rights, or legal
literature that suppliers have actually been priced out of the market
in the relatively few instances in which a living wage requirement
has been implemented.
Companies that adopt a living wage
requirement for their suppliers are probably unlikely to then cut
orders from factories that meet their standard. To do so would invite
the sort of negative campaigning that frequently encourages such
standards in the first place.
In fact, it would be naïve to expect that PLR initiatives will
cause major structural transformations in the global sourcing model
because the model is fully embedded in the operations of the MNCs
that have created it.128 The MNCs have a strong financial interest in
preserving the relative cost savings associated with this model, and
this financial interest mitigates the possibility that MNCs accept
terms in PLR initiatives that threaten their access to relatively cheap
labor. Ultimately, MNCs are more powerful than the other actors at
the PLR table. They can be pressured to respond to spotlight
campaigns targeting specific abuses.129 They can be persuaded to
127.
See Living Wage Standards, supra note 51 (reporting that legal minimum
wages and prevailing industry wages are insufficient to meet workers’ needs).
128.
See, e.g., COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM (Gary Gereffi &
Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 1994) (arguing that cheap labor is ultimately less significant
to profit-maximizing MNCs than such competitive advantages as proprietary
technology, product differentiation, brand reputation, customer relationships, and
constant industrial upgrading); Jennifer Hurley & Doug Miller, The Changing Face of
the Global Garment Industry, in THREADS OF LABOUR 16 (Angela Hale & Jane Wills
eds., 2005) (arguing that despite a seemingly large increase in labor regulation, large
MNCs have been able to utilize increased international scrutiny to maximize profits).
129 Debora L. Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How Multinationals
Export Human Rights, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 7–12 (1998) (highlighting the positive effects
of grassroots activism). For a recent example, see Gap Inc.’s prompt response to
allegations, reported by Karen McVeigh, The Sweatshop High Street: More Brands
Under Fire, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 3, 2007, at 1, of children being used as virtual
slave labor in the production of Gap products in India:
We strictly prohibit the use of child labour. This is a non-negotiable for us—and
we are deeply concerned and upset by this allegation. As we’ve demonstrated in
the past, Gap has a history of addressing challenges like this head-on, and our
approach to this situation will be no exception.
In 2006, Gap Inc. ceased business with 23 factories due to code violations. We
have 90 people located around the world whose job is to ensure compliance with
our Code of Vendor Conduct.
As soon as we were alerted to this situation, we stopped the work order and
prevented the product from being sold in stores. While violations of our strict
prohibition on child labor in factories that produce product for the company are
extremely rare, we have called an urgent meeting with our suppliers in the
region to reinforce our policies.
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engage in constructive dialogues about how things could be done
better.130 They can be convinced to introduce procedural safeguards
to allow for better monitoring of supply chain labor practices.131
Sometimes they can even be pressured to provide the public with
information about how workers are treated in their supplier
factories.132
For this reason, PLR initiatives should be perceived as modest
endeavors. The standards that emerge in internal codes of conduct
reflect corporations’ perceptions of what is required to deflect
negative criticism that could damage brand image. Multi-stakeholder
initiatives result from complex negotiations, conflicts, and dialogue
among various labor activist organizations, such as unions,
consumers, investors, and NGOs, and in some cases, national
governments, intergovernmental organizations, and powerful
economic interests in the form of MNCs and their lobbyists.133 As in
any negotiation, those standards that the various participants can
agree upon represent a compromise, which takes into account the
relative power relations that underlie the negotiation.
The balance of power in the relationship between MNCs and the
many labor activists engaged in PLR campaigns and initiatives
mandates restraint in assessing the potential impact of PLR, and by
proxy the impact of TDLR that would seek to harness PLR. Labor
activists can attempt to push the boundaries by proposing novel
standards, but they have no ability to unilaterally impose the
standards on MNCs. MNCs would be expected to reject measures
that expand their responsibility for supply chain labor practices until

Gap Inc. has one of the industry’s most comprehensive programs in place to
fight for workers’ rights overseas. We will continue to work with the
government, NGOs, trade unions, and other stakeholder organizations in an
effort to end the use of child labour.
Press Release, Gap Inc., Gap Inc. Issues Statement on Media Reports on Child Labor
(Oct. 28, 2007), available at http://www.gapinc.com/public/Media/Press_Releases/med_
pr_vendorlabor102807.shtml.
130.
See, e.g, Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 51 (describing
how both Nike and Levi-Strauss decided, in the 1990s, to engage their critics in a
dialogue about how to improve supply chain labor practices); see also Blackett, supra
note 40, at 442, 446 (describing attempts to bring the business community into a
dialogue with the United Nations).
131.
Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 51 (noting that Nike and
Levi-Strauss responded to demands by labor activists to publish the identity and
addresses of their global suppliers).
132.
For example, some companies have begun to publish statistics of
compliance levels with codes of conduct based on auditing results. See, e.g., GAP INC.,
2007–2008 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2008), available at http://www.gapinc.com/
GapIncSubSites/csr/Utility/report_builder.shtml.
133.
See, e.g., Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 13–20
(describing the contested origins of both the FLA and the Workers’ Rights Consortium);
see generally LIZA FEATHERSTONE, STUDENTS AGAINST SWEATSHOPS (2002) (discussing
the student labor activist organization United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS)).
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(1) a significant consensus emerges within the industry in favor of the
measure; (2) a significant groundswell of consumer, investor, or state
pressure emerges to incorporate those new standards; or (3) the MNC
is satisfied that the benefit to corporate reputation or economic
performance from adopting a measure outweighs its reputational
risks and anticipated costs.
As a result, it is extremely unlikely that PLR initiatives will
cause significant changes in normative labor practices within global
supply chains in the short- to medium-term. The short-term impact
of PLR initiatives on actual labor practices is more likely to manifest
as marginal improvements in levels of compliance with domestic
labor laws, as discussed above.134 However, this alone may be a
useful contribution.
D. PLR Encourages Greater Deliberation and Discourse
About Abusive Supply Chain Labor Practices
PLR initiatives and campaigns serve an even more important
function that is often overlooked in debates about PLR because it is
subtle and often invisible to those observing from outside of the
supply chain process. It is the impact PLR has on the internal
management systems of MNCs, on the ways in which corporations
perceive and manage risks associated with supply chain labor
practices, and on public discourse about these practices. It is in these
more subtle effects that the favorable argument for PLR and the use
of TDLR that would harness it emerges more clearly. While these
effects may not immediately translate into broad-based
improvements in factory conditions, in the longer term they may
contribute to the development of a climate in which those
improvements are more likely to occur.
PLR initiatives and campaigns have encouraged many MNCs to
join a dialogue in which broad-ranging issues related to the global
sourcing model and “root causes” of poor labor practices are
debated.135
Within the debates, protests, arguments, and

134.
See supra Part II.A.
135.
See Press Release, Ethical Trading Action Grp., Revealing Clothing Report
(Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/en/node/449 (“‘Leading
companies have publicly expressed willingness to discuss root causes of persistent
labour rights problems in their supply chains,’ [Kevin] Thomas [spokesperson for
ETAG] said, noting that this year more companies are reporting training programs for
factory management and other efforts to change persistent bad practices.”); see also
Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 55–56 (describing the efforts of LeviStrauss to coordinate information-sharing sessions with competitors and NGOs to
discuss sustained solutions to persistent labor issues in supplier factories); Richard
Locke & Monica Romis, Improving Work Conditions in a Global Supply Chain, 48
MASS. INST. TECH. SLOAN MGMT. REV. 54, 60 (2007) (noting how Nike had “begun an
extensive review of the company’s own upstream business processes—such as product
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negotiations between private labor activists, employers, and MNCs,
an arena of sophisticated deliberations about the causes of labor
practice abuses within global supply chains is emerging, along with a
discussion of the possible solutions to these abuses.136 This is a
useful development, particularly if it leads to changes in the ways
that MNCs manage their supply chain labor practices.
The academic literature has paid very little attention to the
question of how these deliberations influence MNC behavior.137 This
question is important, however, because MNCs can influence how
their suppliers treat workers, particularly if they are major customers
of the supplier. Therefore, in evaluating the role and impact of PLR
initiatives and campaigns, and in considering how TDLR might seek
to influence PLR to positively affect labor practices, it is important to
understand how ideas come to be legitimized within the PLR
discourse, and how those ideas are ultimately absorbed into the riskmanagement processes of the sourcing corporations.
Archon Fung describes how PLR can lead to increasingly
sophisticated arguments about how best to control labor practices
within global supply chains:
In a typical exchange, activists might condemn the suppliers of some
multinational corporation for employing children or paying poor wages,
or a government for condoning such practices. That corporation (or
government) might respond by denying culpability, acknowledging
these claims but pointing out that such treatment is generous by the
standards of the local economy, or by reducing child labor and raising
wages. In such contests, those who demand stronger labor standards
and those who operate under them must offer increasingly credible
claims to be adjudicated in the court of public opinion by a general
audience of consumers, investors, concerned citizens, and

development, design, and commercialization—in order to identify potential drivers of
excessive overtime among suppliers”).
136.
See generally Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13 (discussing
factory list disclosure at Nike and Levi-Strauss).
137.
See Arthurs, supra note 74, at 477, noting the lack of evidence about how
codes of conduct affect MNC behavior: “To put it plainly, there is little or no evidence
about how codes actually affect the behaviour of [MNCs]. Thus, it is something of a
mystery why voluntary codes should have become so numerous in recent years.” There
are other notable exceptions. See Richard Locke, The Promise and Perils of
Globalization: The Case of Nike (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Working Paper Series, Paper No.
IPC–02–007, 2002) (using a case study of Nike to examine the various difficulties and
complexities companies face as they seek to balance both company performance and
good corporate citizenship in today’s global economy); David Murphy & David Mathew,
Nike and Global Labor Practices: A Case Study Prepared for the New Academy of
Business Innovation Network for Socially Responsible Business (Jan. 2001)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.adapt.it/acm-on-line/Home/IndiceA-Z/perargomento/
documento5282.html (discussing how Nike created and implemented its code of
conduct); Dara O’Rourke, Smoke from a Hired Gun: A Critique of Nike’s Labor and
Environmental Auditing in Vietnam as Performed by Ernst & Young, TRANSNAT’L RES.
& ACTION CTR. (Nov. 10, 1997), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=966 (arguing
that accounting firms retained by manufacturers are not the appropriate organizations
to be conducting audits of labor and environmental conditions).
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journalists . . . . In an environment where their claims can be checked,
the demands of activists and responses of corporations become more
reasonable, not because these actors are necessarily motivated by
ethical considerations but because that is what public credibility
demands. Such open deliberation about labor standards creates
opportunities for individuals—as political actors, private consumers, or
even workers—to reflect more deeply about the actual practices of firms
and the impact of those practices upon often-distant workers and
communities. These engagements can in turn transform preferences,
assessments, market behaviors, and political positions.138

Fung argues that public deliberations associated with the PLR
debates are valuable because deliberation causes actors on all sides to
reflect upon the complexities associated with governing labor
practices within a global economic model and to think critically about
how to address these complexities.139
Blackett makes a similar argument:
[C]orporate self-regulatory initiatives open up opportunities for
discussion . . . . [Codes of conduct], and the advocacy they have
generated, have shown the potential to open up spaces for discussion—
spaces that can be used to spotlight regulatory deficits and to promote
cosmopolitan democratic participation by representative stakeholders
in the labor context.140

Admittedly, without government participation and sanctioning
powers the MNCs can walk away from these discussions at any
moment and resist any particular demand by activists. However,
what keeps some MNCs talking and occasionally agreeing to
proposals that emerge from these discussions is their desire to reduce
the reputational risks associated with their supply chain labor
practices or the hope of improving their brand image in the public’s
perception.
Numerous MNCs are taking progressive steps relating to their
supply chain labor practices as a result of engagements with private
labor activist organizations or in response to their demands. Not long
ago MNCs routinely argued that they had no responsibility for labor
conditions in supplier factories. Today it is difficult to find any
company that publicly argues that position.141 Similarly, in the
138.
FUNG, O’ROURKE & SABEL, supra note 48, at 56. Fung, along with his coauthors Charles Sabel and Dara O’Rourke, have made similar arguments about the
value of public deliberations and participation in a dialogue about labor practices
within global supply chains in their Ratcheting Labor Standards series of papers. See,
e.g., Charles Sable, Dara O’Rourke & Archon Fung, Ratcheting Labor Standards:
Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace (World Bank, Social
Protection Discussion Paper No. 0011, 2000).
139.
FUNG, O’ROURKE & SABEL, supra note 48, at 56.
140.
Blackett, supra note 45, at 130.
141.
Nike demonstrates this evolution. In the early 1990s and before, Nike’s
public position was that they had no responsibility for work conditions in their supplier
factories. See DONALD KATZ, JUST DO IT: THE NIKE SPIRIT IN THE CORPORATE WORLD
191 (1994) (quoting a Nike official as saying, “We don’t pay anybody at the factories
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1990s few codes of conduct included any reference to the ILO
Conventions,142 but most multi-stakeholder codes and many internal
corporate codes reference the ILO conventions today.143
Another example is Nike Inc.’s decision to post the names and
addresses of all of its global supplier factories in 2005, following years
of advocacy by labor rights groups and Nike’s protests that factory
identity was crucial business information that was too difficult to
track and maintain.144 Nike’s disclosure prompted Levi-Strauss to do
the same, which then put other large apparel companies that did not
disclose this information on the defensive.145 Some companies felt
the need to publicly explain their decision to keep their supplier list
secret. For example, Gap, Inc. posted an explanation on the
“frequently asked questions” page on its Corporate Social
Responsibility website.146 In the meantime, as more corporations

and we don’t set policy within the factories; it is their business to run.”); Richard
Barnett & John Cavanaugh, Just Undo It: Nike’s Exploited Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 1994, at F11 (quoting Nike’s general manager in Indonesia as saying, “I don’t know
that I need to know [of labor disturbances] . . . . It’s not within our scope to
investigate.”). Nike’s Code of Conduct now includes a list of labor practice standards
that all suppliers are directed to respect. NIKE, INC., CODE OF CONDUCT (2010),
http://www.nikebiz.com/responsibility/documents/Nike_Code_of_Conduct.pdf. Nike is
also a member of the FLA and a participant in the Global Compact, both of which
assume that MNCs have responsibility for conditions of work in their supplier
factories. Press Release, Nike, Inc., Fair Labor Association Accredits Nike Compliance
Program (May 12, 2005), http://www.nikebiz.com/media/pr/2005/05/12_Compliance.html;
U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT & U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EMBEDDING HUMAN
RIGHTS IN BUSINESS PRACTICE II (2007), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_
events/8.1/EHRBPII_Final.pdf.
142.
See, e.g., Hepple, supra note 99, at 360 (noting that in 1999, corporate codes
tended to “export American conceptions of corporate social responsibility” instead of
“reflecting international legal norms”).
143.
For example, the model codes of the SA8000, the Worker Rights
Consortium, the Global Compact, and the Ethical Trading Initiative all refer directly to
the ILO’s Conventions. SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, supra note 50, at 4; WORKER
RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, supra note 116, § III(C)(6)(b) (requiring licensees to mandate
that their employees and subcontractors comply with ILO health and safety
conventions); The Global Compact and the International Labour Organization, U.N.
GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/participantsandstakeholders/un_
agencies/International_Labour_Organization.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010); ETI
Base Code, supra note 44.
144.
Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 19−21.
145.
Id.
146.
The relevant question is “When will you publish a list of factories you do
business with in the developing world?” Frequently Asked Questions – Social Responsibility,
GAP INC., http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/sr_faq.shtml#a117 (last visited
Sept. 26, 2010). In response, the website states:
We don't list specific factories for a variety of reasons. First, the factories
producing our goods constantly change based on seasonal production needs. At
any one time, we are working with approximately 2,000 factories. Second, we
strongly believe that our sourcing base of approved factories is proprietary
information. We invest a lot of time, effort and money in identifying factories
that meet our product-quality and vendor-compliance standards. We also invest
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disclose this information, it becomes more and more difficult for
laggards to argue that this sort of information has crucial business
value or that producing the information is not technically or
financially feasible.
These developments are the direct result of the deliberations
that have become commonplace in the PLR movement. Labor
activists make a proposal they believe will improve supply chain labor
practices, and arguments follow about why the proposal is or is not a
good policy. More often than not, MNCs participate directly in these
debates, as do academics, NGOs, business lobby groups, and even
governments.147 The ideas that gain traction are those that are
economically and practically viable from the MNCs’ perspectives.
Furthermore, these ideas are backed with the weight of persuasive
arguments that MNCs’ fears might resonate with customers,
investors, and governments.
Activists, including NGOs, human rights organizations, and
unions, must also be prepared to publicly defend their claims and
proposals. They are challenged to reflect on their motivations for
attempting to influence labor conditions in other parts of the world
and on whether their proposed solutions will actually improve the
lives of workers there.148 Activists in developed countries must

a lot of time in working with factories to continually improve conditions. Any
factory has limited production capacity, and we are in a very competitive
business. We believe it would be unwise to provide a complete list of approved
factories for our competitors to use. However, when working with nongovernmental organizations, labor unions or others to address factory
conditions or specific issues in a city, region or country, we do provide
information about whether we have production in specific factories and what
we are doing to resolve issues.
Id.
147.
For example, the consultations undertaken in support of the Canadian
government’s study into the proposal to require factory disclosure included
participation by members of Canada’s apparel and retail industries, as well as unions
and other NGOs. See THE CONFERENCE BD. OF CANADA, supra note 87, at 11–20.
Another example is the MFA Forum, an initiative bringing together NGOs, unions, and
major apparel corporations to encourage dialogue about the impact of the phase-out of
the MFA tariff system on the dozens of developing countries that were expected to be
adversely impacted by the removal of tariffs on imported apparel goods into the United
States and Europe which took effect in January 2005. MFA Forum in Brief, MFA
FORUM, http://www.mfa-forum.net/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). As part of this
initiative, a pilot project is underway in Lesotho that is exploring, among other options,
a model that would see this small South African country market itself as a strong
labor-compliance country specializing in apparel production factories. Lesotho: An
Introduction,
MFA
FORUM,
http://www.mfaforum.net/groups/Lesotho/Introduction.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2010); see also
RIVOLI, supra note 15, at 157−72 (discussing the MFA and the impact of its phase-out).
148.
Critics of PLR emphasize how workers and governments of the developing
countries are seldom asked their opinions about whether they believe the PLR
campaigns and initiatives will actually help the workers they target. See, e.g., Kaushik
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wrestle with the argument that their activities may actually cause job
losses in developing countries and make matters worse for the
workers they purport to assist.149 This is not a frivolous concern. It
forces labor activist organizations to present arguments that
demonstrate an understanding of the complex balancing required to
identify standards and policies that will improve labor practices in
developing countries without undermining the comparative labor cost
advantage that employers in those countries enjoy.
Therefore, the emergence of PLR has generated a useful dialogue
about how working conditions can be improved within global supply
chains. Significantly, in recent years, this dialogue has turned its
gaze inward, towards the global sourcing business model and how it
contributes to poor labor conditions in supplier factories. Companies
such as the Gap, Nike, and Levi-Strauss—and, in Canada, Mountain
Equipment Co-op and the Hudson’s Bay Company—employ “labor
compliance” professionals who engage labor activist organizations in
discussions about how to address systemic root causes that contribute
to labor abuses.150 These root causes include short-time turnover of
orders; last-minute design changes that force suppliers into a position
of requiring excessive overtime;151 the prevalence of short-term
supplier contracts, which leave suppliers under threat of losing orders
if they invest in necessary changes to bring their workplaces into
compliance with code or legal requirements; and contract tendering
systems that reward low-cost bids over other factors such as highperformance results in labor audits.152
Basu, The View from the Tropics, in FUNG, O’ROURKE & SABEL, supra note 48, at 59,
59−64.
149.
For example, this tension was obvious in the contentious debates leading to
the adoption of a code of labor conduct by the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU), the main global umbrella organization of trade unions. The
ICFTU struggled to find a consensus that would satisfy unions from the economicallyadvanced global North and unions from developing countries. See Rebecca GumbellMcCormick, The ICTFU and Trade Unions in Developing Countries: Solidarity or
Independence?, in UNIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 179,
188−89 (Anil Verma & Thomas Kochan eds., 2004).
150.
See infra text accompanying note 159.
151.
See GAP INC., supra note 115, at 29 (“As our social responsibility efforts
have evolved, we’ve come to see that some of the everyday practices in our
industry . . . can have a significant impact on working conditions in factories.”). The
section refers and provides a link to a summary of a study conducted by the NGO
Women Working Worldwide on Gap Inc.’s supply chain. Id. The study identified three
major problems in the management of Gap’s supply chain that lead supplier factories
to violate labor laws and code requirements, including delays at other parts of the
supply chain and changes in production requirements made by Gap personnel. Id.; see
also OXFAM INT’L, TRADING AWAY OUR RIGHTS: WOMEN WORKING IN GLOBAL SUPPLY
CHAINS 51 (2004), http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rights.pdf.
152.
OXFAM INT’L, supra note 151, at 51; see also, e.g., MSN Supporters Have
Spoken: Pay a Living Wage; Respect Workers’ Right to Freedom of Association; and Deal
with Purchasing Practices!, MAQUILA SOLIDARITY NETWORK (Jan. 10, 2008),
http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/en/node/752/print (indicating that the labor rights NGO
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Discussions about the root causes of poor supply chain labor
practices are a recent development, born of pressure exerted on
MNCs by private actors over a period of nearly two decades.153 The
discourse surrounding PLR initiatives previously focused primarily
on the content of labor standards and on monitoring and reporting
systems. Today, there is more discussion of what changes need to be
made to the global sourcing model itself.
This dialogue is driven primarily by private labor activists, but
MNCs are increasingly taking up the idea of examining the supply
chain business model for factors that contribute to labor practice
abuses as a means of potentially reducing both the risks of
association with abusive labor practices and the costs of monitoring
those practices.154 Although MNCs are not required to implement
ideas that surface in these dialogues with external stakeholders,
some occasionally find business value in implementing the
stakeholders’ suggestions.155 This observation aligns with the views
of Oliver Gerstenberg and Charles Sabel, who noted, “in a complex
world, ‘strong’ actors cannot rule out the possibility that they will
come to depend on solutions discovered by ‘weak’ ones.”156

intends to address, as a strategic goal in the forthcoming year, the harmful effects on
supplier chain labor practices of the “purchasing practices of MNCs” ).
153.
There is, to date, little academic literature examining root cause analysis in
relation to global supply chain labor practices. But see Locke & Romis, supra note 135,
at 61 (“It is time to move beyond merely focusing on codes of conduct and monitoring—
so that we can tackle the root causes of poor working conditions in many developing
countries.”). Many corporations today make reference to the need for the company to
engage in root cause analysis to identify how changes in management systems may
contribute to a climate of improved labor practices. See, e.g., GAP INC., supra note 115,
at 22.
The root causes of poor working conditions in garment factories are varied and
complex. As we noted in our 2004 Social Responsibility Report, inadequate
labor standards are often the result of a wide range of factors that can be
difficult to isolate and address. In some areas, such as our buying practices, we
may have considerable ability to drive change.
Id.; see also Action Plan Update, GILDAN, http://gildan.com/corporate/corporate
Citizenship/actionPlanUpdate.cfm (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (explaining the need to
conduct “root cause analysis” training throughout the organization).
154.
See Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 51–55 (describing
several supply chain reforms undertaken by Nike and Levi-Strauss).
155.
Nike’s decision to disclose its global supplier list in response to demands by
labor activists is one example. See id. at 18−20.
156.
Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An
Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED
MARKET 289, 292−93 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002).
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E. PLR May Influence Internal Management Systems
of Multinational Corporations in Useful Ways
By increasing the risk associated with being linked to a
suppliers’ abusive labor practices, PLR initiatives and campaigns
may also motivate some MNCs to establish more sophisticated
internal management systems designed to track and respond quickly
to potentially embarrassing labor-related situations. This too would
be a useful development because whether or not MNCs are able and
inclined to influence their suppliers’ labor practices depends on how
they collect, manage, and process information about those labor
practices.157
As already discussed, Nike and Levi-Strauss, two of the most
highly visible brand-based apparel companies, instituted internal
supply chain management systems in response to pressure from PLR
campaigns.158 In addition to the adoption and publication of a code of
conduct, the changes included the creation of dedicated labor
compliance departments headed by senior executives and staffed by
teams of labor compliance personnel; the development of an
information database that tracks labor practice issues in every
supplier factory; the development of information processing systems
that encourage information about labor practice problems to be
conveyed to senior executives; the creation of multilevel factory
monitoring systems; the introduction of regular meetings with senior
labor compliance staff to review factory compliance issues; and the
development of outreach programs to encourage dialogue with labor
activist organizations and industry competitors.159
Although these kinds of internal management systems do not
ensure decent labor practices in supplier factories, they do increase
the probability that a firm discovers labor practice abuses, which
improves the chances that the company will attempt to intervene.
The stronger the threat to corporate reputation from MNC complicity
in labor abuses, the greater the incentive for those MNCs to better
manage their suppliers’ labor practices. A strong PLR movement can
elevate that risk, and a law empowering that movement can create an
even greater incentive for MNCs to insist on suppliers who comply
with labor laws.
For example, the Canadian Retail Council has argued that many
Canadian apparel companies and retailers are not even aware of

157.
See, e.g., Hepple, supra note 99, at 351 (“Whether or not the quality of
employment is raised throughout the global chain of production and distribution
depends largely on corporate integration strategies.”).
158.
Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 25−28, 40−43.
159.
Id. at 51−55.

1000

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

[Vol. 43:953

what factories produce their goods.160 The obvious implication is that
these companies have no idea how workers are treated in those
factories. If a strong PLR movement can pressure MNCs into at least
paying attention to which factory makes their products, then it could
prove to be a useful contribution in the challenge to improve labor
practices.
F. PLR May Encourage Industry Collaboration Towards
Finding Sustainable Solutions to Reputation-Damaging
Labor Practice Abuses
Among the potential outcomes of PLR is greater industry
collaboration aimed at identifying ways to address shared problems
in the management of global supply chain labor practices. Secrecy
has traditionally been the mantra of the global apparel industry.161
More recently, common challenges, risks, and expenses have caused a
growing number of apparel corporations to reach out to competitors in
attempts to reduce costly duplication of factory monitoring processes
and to brainstorm about possible strategies to reduce the risk of
negative publicity associated with supply chain labor practices.162
For example, the Fair Factories Clearinghouse initiative created
in 2004 by a number of apparel companies compiles and shares
factory monitoring and auditing reports among FFC members.163 At
a more macro level, the recently formed Joint Initiative on
Corporate Accountability and Workers' Rights brought together the
world’s leading private labor regulation initiatives in an attempt to
consolidate efforts, approaches, and standards targeting supply chain
labor practices.164

160.
See Erica Johnson, ‘Cut It Out’ Campaign Focuses on Sweatshop Labour,
CBC MARKETPLACE (Mar. 27, 2002), http://www.cbc.ca/consumers/market/files/home/
cutitout (quoting Sharon Maloney, spokesperson for the Canadian Retail Council as
saying, “tracking clothing factories is almost impossible”).
161.
The reason given by most companies for refusing to publicly disclose the
identity of their suppliers is that this information is of great proprietary value and
therefore, must be kept hidden from competitors. For example, this was Nike’s position
prior to its decision to disclose this information. Doorey, Factory Listing Disclosure,
supra note 13, at 31. This was also the position of Canadian retailers and apparel
manufacturers during consultations about a proposed law to require public disclosure
of this information. See THE CONFERENCE BD. OF CANADA, supra note 87, at 13 (2003).
162.
See Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 55−56 (discussing
Nike’s and Levi-Strauss’s efforts to reach out toward competitors in an effort to jointly
improve supply chain monitoring).
163.
The FFC Mission, FAIR FACTORIES CLEARINGHOUSE, http:/www.
fairfactories.org/what%2Dwe%2Ddo/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
164.
See About Us, JOINT INITIATIVE ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
WORKERS’ RIGHTS, http://www.jo-in.org/pub/about.shtml (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
The participating organizations are the Clean Clothes Campaign, Ethical Trading
Initiative, FLA, Fair Wear Foundation, Social Accountability International, and
Workers Rights Consortium. Id. The stated objectives of the Joint Initiative are:
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Spontaneous, informal collaborations among competitors are also
emerging. Executives at both Nike and Levi-Strauss came to believe
in recent years that industry collaboration—including information
sharing, coordinated monitoring, and brainstorming about possible
solutions to persistent labor practice issues—offers greater potential
for improving labor practices (and, therefore, of reducing corporate
risk) than the traditional approach of secrecy.165 A similar shift in
focus towards working with competitors is evident in the public
documents and actions of other leading apparel companies in recent
years.166
Greater industry collaboration on issues related to supply chain
labor practices is a positive development. Industry collaboration and
brainstorming within industry, as well as collaboration between
industry and the many labor activists participating in the PLR
movement, may identify useful processes that could positively
influence the business environment in which labor decisions are
made. Companies may internalize these processes in the hope of
being perceived as corporate social responsibility leaders.
Alternatively, companies may internalize these processes as a risk
management decision, which would pressure other companies to
institute similar systems. States also might learn from these
deliberations in ways that could inform new legislation.
These possibilities are not as remote as they may appear at first
glance. The success of the PLR movement of the past decade in
causing MNCs to pay closer attention to their supply chain labor
practices, to reduce corporate risk, and to engage antagonistic private
actors about root causes of poor labor practices, speaks to the
potential. This is not to suggest that the concerns about PLR

to maximise the effectiveness and impact of multi-stakeholder approaches to
the implementation and enforcement of codes of conduct, by ensuring that
resources are directed as efficiently as possible to improving the lives of
workers and their families; to explore possibilities for closer co-operation
between the organizations; and to share learning on the manner in which
voluntary codes of labor practice contribute to better workplace conditions in
global supply chains.
Id.
165.
For example, following the release of their global factory list, Levi-Strauss
executives began organizing informal, roaming roundtable discussions with Nike and
several other competitors in which the companies share information and strategies
about how to address labor issues in shared supplier factories. Interview with Michael
Kobori, Vice President Code of Conduct, Levi-Strauss, in S.F., Cal. (Apr. 2007). Mr.
Kobori informed me that this development reflected the emerging opinion within the
organization that industry collaboration in addressing labor practices will and should
begin to grow in the years to come. Id.
166.
See Doorey, Factory List Disclosure, supra note 13, at 23−38 (reviewing in
detail the shift at Nike from a position of secrecy and unilateralism to collaboration
and transparency); see also GAP INC., supra note 115, at 34.
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initiatives and campaigns described in Part II of this Article should
be disregarded. A common theme flowing through each of those
objections is that PLR initiatives and campaigns threaten to interfere
with the complex balancing that characterizes any industrial
relations systems, without full appreciation of the interests of the
local actors and local economic, social, and political circumstances.
Part IV argues that while this is an important concern, it should not
be perceived as an argument against the TDLR project. Rather, it is
a prescriptive argument that provides guidance at to what the
objectives of a TDLR project should be and therefore what types of
PLR initiatives should be pursued and harnessed as part of that
project.
IV. THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL ACTORS
The previous Part made a number of claims about the utility of
private labor regulation in the struggle to improve supply chain labor
practices. It noted that while PLR has occasionally produced
headline-grabbing results, for the most part, its impact has been
modest. It keeps the issue of labor practices on the public radar and,
by raising the risk potential of negative publicity and consequent
damage to brand reputation, it creates an incentive for companies to
pay attention to how their suppliers treat workers and to take steps
to ensure that they are not complicit in the illegal labor practices of
those suppliers. That discussion relates to the underlying question
being explored in this Article: should governments use domestic
regulation to influence foreign labor practices, such as by harnessing
or steering PLR in ways that might cause foreign employers to treat
their workers better?
The notion of using regulation to harness or influence the normcreating potential of private actors is not itself a novel idea. Labor
lawyers are familiar with this way of thinking about law. North
American collective bargaining laws, for example, are described as
“procedural” regulations because they develop a framework under
which private bargaining about substantive work conditions
occurs.167 Health and safety laws that mandate joint worker–
employer councils and require them to consult and bargain over

167.
Arthurs, supra note 74, at 475−77; see William B. Gould IV, The Third Way:
Labor Policy Beyond the New Deal, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 751, 754 (2000) (describing the
“genius of the New Deal” as being its fundamental presumption that “responsibility for
the social contract [should be placed] in the hands of the parties themselves to be
resolved through collective bargaining”).
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safety rules,168 as well as European “works councils” laws that
require employers to inform, consult, and sometimes bargain with
worker representatives, rely on a similar philosophy.169 For labor
lawyers, therefore, the argument that regulation can be used to
harness the private systems of governance—such as codes of conduct,
private monitoring, public reporting, and consumer boycotts—in
pursuit of public policy objectives is not particularly controversial or
novel.
However, there is something qualitatively different about TDLR
because it requires a move beyond the level of the nation-state, where
labor lawyers feel most comfortable. Within a nationally-based
industrial relations system, it is relatively easy to identify the
relevant actors and to chart the influences acting on the labor
practice norms of a particular workplace or industry.170
The
employees, their union, and their employer are always at the core of
this analysis.
Exogenous pressures—forces from outside the
workplace—influence those core actors. Regulatory law structures
their engagements and provides contractual “floors.”171 Product and
labor markets influence bargaining options, and social factors
influence attitudes.172 Ultimately, however, the interactions of the
workers, unions, and employers determine the rules that will apply in
any workplace setting.173
The shift to the role of PLR that targets MNCs and labor
practices within their globally dispersed supplier factories obscures
the role of employers and employees. Very little has been said about
the participation and opinions of the factory workers, or even the
factory owners, in this Article’s preceding discussion of PLR
initiatives. Are those actors not entitled to participate in decisions
that will most directly impact their lives? How are the interests of
employers and employees represented in deliberations occurring in
London, New York, Washington, San Francisco, Tokyo, Amsterdam,
and Toronto?
Sometimes, factory workers’ and local workers’ organizations
have played an important role in PLR campaigns and initiatives.
This was the case, for instance, in the previously discussed campaign

168.
See Lobel, supra note 8, at 462 (describing the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration’s (OSHA) use of health and safety governance initiatives to
improve collaboration within a firm).
169.
JOEL ROGERS & WOLFGANG STREECK, WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION,
REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 339−43 (1995).
170.
See JOHN DUNLOP, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS 227−52, 287−88 (rev.
ed. 1993) (stating that the term “industrial relations system” is variable in scope, and
that as the scope of the system grows broader, the status of the actors within the
system are particularly affected and become less well-defined).
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
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against Gildan Activewear, which targeted incidents at Honduran
factories in which Honduran workers’ organizations played a leading
strategic role in the campaign and in implementing and monitoring
the remediation plan.174 In a 2006 report of labor practice case
studies in the global sportswear industry, Oxfam describes a series of
instances in which local unions or workers’ organizations participated
directly in public relations campaigns intended to persuade MNCs to
pressure local factory owners to comply with labor laws.175
Initiatives such as the Clean Clothes Campaign and the Worker
Rights Consortium engage in campaigns only at the invitation of the
local workers affected.176
Local voices are not always included, however. Many of the
leading PLR initiatives were designed and are still managed without
any meaningful input from the actors whom they target. For
example, although representatives of industry, universities, unions,
and NGOs were invited to participate in the negotiations leading to
the creation of the FLA, all invitees were American-based, and the
managing board of the FLA has always consisted exclusively of
representatives from American organizations. Some proposals to
improve supply chain labor practices, such as the much discussed
“Ratcheting Labor Standards” model of Sabel, Fung, and Dara
O’Rourke, do not require any participation or consent from local
workers or their organizations.177

174.
See MSN Closes the Book on Honduras Complaint, MAQUILA SOLIDARITY
NETWORK (Dec. 31, 2006), http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/gildan/honduras/elprogreso
(“Grassroots campaigns targeting Gildan Activewear in Canada and the United States
succeeded in pressuring Gildan to enter into an agreement with MSN and the WRC to
provide first-hire preference to all former El Progreso workers, including union
supporters, at its other sewing facilities in Honduras.”).
175.
See TIM KELLY & KELLY DENT, OXFAM INT’L, OFFSIDE! LABOUR RIGHTS AND
SPORTSWEAR PRODUCTION IN ASIA 38 (Maureen Bathgate ed., 2006).
The SPN union respresents [sic] Doson workers [in Indonesia]. It organised a
vigorous campaign calling on Nike to keep ordering from Doson or, at the very
least, to pay workers their full legal entitlements to severance and holiday pay.
On 20 August 2002, 4,000 Doson workers marched to the US embassy in
support of these demands. Doson workers organised similar demonstrations in
other parts of Jakarta in the months that followed.
Id. (citation omitted).
176.
See, e.g., What We Believe In, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN,
http://www.cleanclothes.org/about-us/what-we-believe-in (last visited Sept. 26, 2010)
(“Workers can best assess their needs and the risks they take when asserting their
rights. Public campaigns and other initiatives to take action in cases of rights
violations and the development of strategies to address these issues must be done in
consultation with workers or their representatives.”).
177.
FUNG, O’ROURKE & SABEL, supra note 48, at 4−5 (arguing for monitoring,
public disclosure, and a pool of easily accessible information to provide incentives for
firms to improve the factories in their supply chains). But see Cooney, supra note 75, at
332−33 (identifying several weaknesses with the ratcheting labor standards proposal);
Murray, supra note 75, at 19−36 (criticizing the proposal).
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One response to the criticism that PLR decision making
processes ignore the views and experiences of those actors whom they
most affect is that those opinions are accounted for through the
dynamic shaped by the respective interests of the participants in the
PLR debates. For instance, local actors who are concerned that PLR
initiatives will drive up costs and cause job losses are protected by the
fact that the principal interest of MNCs is maximizing profits from
global sourcing of their products. As a result, the MNCs have a
strong incentive to ensure that PLR initiatives remain modest in
terms of their potential impact on factory labor practices. Local
actors who would like for labor conditions to improve but fear this
will cause the MNCs to cancel orders are protected by the efforts of
labor activists to discourage the practice of cutting and running. In
other words, it might be argued that MNCs and Northern-based
activists vicariously represent the interests of factory owners and
factory employees.
There is some truth in this argument. However, it is also a
paternalistic claim that fails to capture the richness and diversity of
the opinions that may exist at the local factory level. In fact, the
employees and their employers in the supplier factories, as well as
other local actors, may have important perspectives on the causes of
labor practice problems and possible solutions that are not at all
obvious to participants in the PLR dialogues taking place many
thousands of miles away. There may be distinctly local explanations
for labor compliance problems at a particular factory. The employees
may not want the “assistance” of PLR at all for any number of
reasons, including fear that the PLR, if implemented, will make their
situation worse or because they believe that they can fix the problems
in their own ways, using local resources and strategies.
These possibilities present a challenge for PLR, and, by
implication, for forms of regulation designed to harness PLR towards
policy objectives. PLR is useful because of its tendency to encourage
broad-based deliberations about important issues and to cause
valuable corporate self-reflection. However, it can also be blind to
important stakeholder interests, particularly when those
stakeholders lack the power to insert their own voices into the
process.178 The absence of local voices—the opinions of factory
workers, unions in developing countries where the factories are
situated, the factory employers, and even the local governments

178.
See Arthurs, supra note 74, at 487; Claire Dickerson, Transnational Codes
of Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the Playing Field for Developing-Country
Workers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 611, 624 (2001) (describing the “psychological distance”
between a large hub company and the employees of its suppliers); Kolben, supra note 5,
at 230 (“Nor does the design of codes necessarily reflect the preferences or input of
workers, or other stakeholders, that the codes purport to benefit. Instead, these codes
are designed from the top down and are unaccountable and undemocratic.”).
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presiding over the factories—threatens the legitimacy of PLR and the
entire TDLR project. It can blind participants to the reality of
industrial relations that few, if any, workplace problems are solved in
the long term without the active participation of the local industrial
relations actors—workers and their unions, employers, and local
governments.179
Most knowledgeable observers agree that sustainable change of
the sort necessary to alter workplace practices in the long run will
require local level participation, including empowering workers to
enable them to bargain for improved employment conditions with
their employers.180 Harry Arthurs makes this point:
Voluntary codes are emerging as the most significant feature of a
fragile, inchoate regime of transnational labour market regulation.
Employers are supposed to be the object of that regulation, but they are
also its primary authors and administrators; they can conjure it up or
make it disappear pretty much whenever and for whatever reason they
wish. But workers—supposedly the subjects, the beneficiaries of this
regulation—lack the power to create it, significantly to influence its
terms, or even to insist that they receive its promised benefits; they can
only denounce it and try to rob it of its legitimacy. We must somehow
square this circle.181

Sean Cooney similarly argues that “if local workers are not involved
in devising, monitoring, and evaluating measures to reduce labour
abuses, such measures may be unresponsive to worker needs,
disempowering, and patronising.”182
The moral is that the most useful PLR initiatives and campaigns
will be those that focus on empowering workers at the factory level
and on building a climate in which the governments of host states
and factory owners are prepared to recognize labor rights. This

179.
See Dickerson, supra note 178, at 614 (stressing the importance of
encouraging MNCs to listen to workers in developing countries).
180.
See, e.g., Basu, supra note 6, at 495 (endorsing the argument that a longterm solution to the problem of child labor will involve continuing to purchase goods
from developing nations, thereby increasing the demand for adult labor and improving
the bargaining power of adult laborers); Blackett, supra note 40, at 415−16 (arguing for
the long-term importance of ensuring employees have the freedom to unionize, but
remaining skeptical that employers would allow for freedom of association in the
absence of a public regulatory framework); Kolben, supra note 5, at 251−52 (arguing
that local actors are best situated to identify lasting solutions to the problem of
persistent labor abuses and that “rather than disempowering unions and local NGOs,
transparent monitoring has provided information to NGOs and unions, which Doorey
believes, as do I, are better situated than consumers to strategize on how to improve
conditions and pressure brands”); Pollin et al., supra note 122, at 170 (arguing that
foreign labor activists are a useful supplement to workers’ efforts to win better labor
conditions, but that “it will be crucial for workers and unions to become increasingly
active in this movement, especially if monitoring practices are going to reasonably
address their workplace concerns”).
181.
Arthurs, supra note 74, at 487.
182.
Cooney, supra note 75, at 332.
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realization needs to guide any attempt to utilize TDLR for the
purpose of improving foreign labor practices. The challenge is to
identify ways that American laws, for example, could help normalize
processes in foreign factories and shift the attitudes of workers,
unions, employers, and governments over time towards greater
acceptance of labor rights.183
This is an ambitious program that requires patience and a longterm, multilayered plan and nuanced approach that recognizes
differences in local situations. It is a program that requires a
“weaving together [of] normative arenas at many levels and across
borders, deploying private rules, local practices, national laws,
supranational forums, and international law . . . .”184 PLR initiatives
and campaigns are only one part of that complex puzzle, and their
potential contribution should not be overstated. Ultimately, real
change in normative labor practices will require local solutions
brought about by changes in domestic industrial relations systems.
V. CONCLUSION
Still, for the reasons discussed in this paper, PLR initiatives and
campaigns can play a useful role in keeping supply chain labor
practices on corporate agendas and in encouraging developments in
the ways MNCs manage their supply chains and engage external
actors in dialogues about how to improve labor practices. PLR
empowers local workers by exposing labor abuses and by pressuring
MNCs to address those abuses through engagement with factory
owners, rather than by cutting and running. It can boost regulatory
capacity within states by encouraging MNCs to respond favorably to
countries that enforce labor laws and by punishing those who do not.
A thoughtful TDLR project could encourage these positive aspects of
PLR.
Certain questions should guide a TDLR project targeting foreign
labor practices. How can we encourage PLR outcomes that will
empower local workers and their organizations over time? How can
we influence PLR to create norms that empower and encourage
foreign governments to more effectively protect core labor rights?
How can we encourage these kinds of improvements without
simultaneously undermining the ability of developing states to
attract and retain foreign investment from MNCs or causing factory

183.
See Kolben, supra note 5, at 234 (arguing that PLR can “potentially change
norms on the ground” by introducing labor rights into local discourses in ways that can,
over time, reduce local employer and state government resistance).
184.
David Trubek et al., Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor
Relations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks, 25 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 1187, 1193 (2000).
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owners to layoff workers? And, ultimately, what impact will all of
this have on actual labor practices in supplier factories?
These are not easy questions. They appear to require lawmakers
to, among other things, learn how supply chains operate, learn what
forces influence decisions about labor practices in foreign places and
how PLR influences those forces, and to anticipate how legal signals
transmitted through domestic regulation into this milieu will be
interpreted and acted upon. The hope is that these responses might
lead to positive developments in foreign industrial relations systems
that could translate into improvements on factory floors. The sheer
complexity of the project may be enough to discourage many
lawmakers, even if they are otherwise supportive of a project aimed
at encouraging improved labor practices within global supply
chains.185
On the other hand, it is possible that some relatively modest
legislative steps could provoke useful changes in the ways in which
labor practices are managed within global supply chains. Mandatory
reporting on matters related to supply chain labor practices is one
option that has been explored.186 Another option is to require
companies to adopt codes of conduct and to monitor and report on
compliance with those codes.187 If these sorts of legislative schemes
alter the balance of power within the foreign industrial relations
systems in their favor, they could prove useful to workers in
developing countries in their struggle to win improvements in
working conditions. In addition, these schemes could create an
incentive for MNCs to remain with a supplier despite marginal

185.
Julia Black provides a skeptical explanation of how reflexive, de-centered
regulation avoids problems associated with more formal, command-and-control-style
regulation. See Julia Black, Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I, 20 O.J.L.S. 597, 603
(2000).
Procedural law is a shift to more indirect and abstract guidance mechanisms,
but ones which are, like material law, purposive in their orientation. It is the
recognition of a heterarchical and not hierarchical relationship between
politics, law, and other social systems; its central characteristic is decentral,
context regulation. It attempts to affect (irritate) the system in such a way that
it moves from its current state to that which is required. . . . Procedural law
requires only(!) that the state understands the strategic structures of systems,
‘what makes them tick,’ knowledge which Tuebner argues it can acquire with
limited empirical work . . . .
Id.
186.
See, e.g., Hess, supra note 8 (arguing in favour of legislation that would
require corporations to undertake “social accounting and auditing” and to disclose their
findings); Doorey, Who Made That?, supra note 3 (exploring the use of domestic
disclosure regulation as a means of influencing foreign labor practices).
187.
This appears to be a component of the “Ratcheting Labor Standards” model
proposed by FUNG, O’ROURKE, & SABEL, supra note 48, at 5; see also Act Respecting the
Labeling, Sale, Importation, and Advertising of Consumer Textile Articles, R.S.C. 1985,
c. T–10.
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increases in labor costs associated with those improvements. That is
the challenge for the design of transnational domestic labor
regulation and its advocates.

